Tooth to tail ratio: Nederland scoort goed

(Bron: McKinsey, 2010, gebaseerd op ISS rapport uit 2008)

Percentages gevechtstroepen, gevechtsondersteunende eenheden 

en overige

Turkey asks NATO to extend Patriot mission

NATO UNCLASSIFIED

TUDEL/2013/737

Brussels, 8  November 20 13

Dear Mr. Secretary General,

Thanks to Your able leadership and the solidarity demonstrated by the Allies, the Council,  in response to our request dated 21 November 2012, had agreed at its meeting of 4 December 2012 at the level of Ministers of Foreign Affairs to augment Turkey's air defense capabilities within the framework of the NATO Integrated Air Defense System (NATINADS) to preserve, protect and enhance the ability to defend the population and territory of my country. Furthermore, the Council had decided to regularly assess the implementation of its decision of 4 December 2012.

We welcome and continue to appreciate the deployment of Patriot missile batteries by Germany, the Netherlands and the United States in line with the Council decision, concretely demonstrating Alliance solidarity and resolve.

In view of the continuing instability along NATO's south-eastern border, the rationale for the continuation of the augmentation of Turkey's air defence capabilities still remain valid. Indeed, SACEUR's last report dated 27 September 2013 (P0(2013)0469) regarding NATO Support to Turkey-Patriot Deployment confirms that "the overall assessment of  risks and threat to Turkey remains unchanged. The risk to Turkey posed by Syria's ballistic missile capability remains credible". The report also refers to the use of chemical weapons on 21 August 2013 and concludes that "the situation in Syria remains unstable".

On  this basis, we request the continuation of the existing augmentation of Turkey's air defence capabilities by maintaining  the deployment of Patriot batteries as well as the affiliated personnel, in line with our previous request of 21 November 2012 and the Council decision of 4 December 2012. In this context, the deployment will continue to be defensive only; it will in no way support a No Fly Zone or any offensive operation, and Turkey will continue to provide Host Nation Support as specified in the Implementing Agreement signed between SHAPE and Turkey on 12 January 2013.

The continuation of the deployment would reaffirm the determination of NATO to deter threats and defend Turkey, reflecting and confirming once again the Alliance solidarity.

I  am sending a copy of this letter to the Allied Permanent  Representatives, Chairman of the Military Committee and SACEUR.

(signed)

(Fatih Ceylan)

H.E. Anders Fogh Rasmussen
NATO Secretary General
Brussels

(Defensie weblog, 12 November 2013)

Kamerbrief: Letter of Intent met België over gezamenlijke bewaking luchtruim

de Voorzitter van de Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal
Plein 2
2511 CR Den Haag
Datum 23 oktober 2013
Betreft Samenwerking België bij luchtruimbewaking

Letter of Intent met België
Zoals uiteengezet in de nota In het belang van Nederland van 17 september jl. (Kamerstuk 33 763, nr. 1) hebben België en Nederland de intentie te komen tot de gezamenlijke bewaking met jachtvliegtuigen van het luchtruim van de Benelux, in het bijzonder ten aanzien van de Quick Reaction Alert (QRA) en Renegade-taken.

De QRA is een Navo-taak die reeds in multinationaal verband wordt uitgevoerd op basis van het Navo-verdrag en die betrekking heeft op het onderkennen en eventueel onderscheppen van vijandige of ongeïdentificeerde militaire luchtvaartuigen. De QRA-taak berust op de grondwettelijke taak van de bescherming van het eigen en bondgenootschappelijk grondgebied. De Renegade-taak is een nationale taak onder verantwoordelijkheid van de minister van Veiligheid en Justitie en is een vorm van nationale militaire bijstand door Defensie. De Renegade-taak berust op artikel 58 van de Politiewet 2012. Gezamenlijke uitvoering van de Renegade-taak in Benelux-verband vereist een internationale juridische basis in de vorm van een verdrag.

Op 23 oktober jl. hebben mijn Belgische collega en ik een Letter of Intent (LoI) ondertekend die het formele begin van de uitwerking van deze samenwerking markeert. U treft de LoI in bijlage aan. De LoI bouwt voort op de ministeriële verklaring van de Benelux-ministers van Defensie van 18 april 2012. Na deze Benelux-verklaring hebben de luchtmachten van België en Nederland al vastgesteld dat er geen technische of operationele belemmeringen voor samenwerking zijn. Luxemburg beschikt niet over een luchtmacht.

Beide landen zullen nu de opstelling van het verdrag ten behoeve van de samenwerking op het gebied van de Renegade-taak actief ter hand nemen en Luxemburg zal nauwgezet over de vorderingen worden geïnformeerd. De Kamer zal bij het verdrag worden betrokken in overeenstemming met de Rijkswet goedkeuring en bekendmaking verdragen. Ik verwacht dat de samenwerking in 2016 zal zijn geëffectueerd, dat wil zeggen ruim voordat de F-35 in 2019 instroomt. Overigens kunnen Nederland en België bij de luchtruimbewaking samenwerken ongeacht het type jachttoestel van beide landen. De wijze van aansturing is onafhankelijk van het type vliegtuig en Navo-standaarden garanderen een gelijke uitvoering.

Met deze aankondiging reageer ik tevens op uw verzoek van 3 oktober jl. (kenmerk 2013Z18157/2013D39014) om informatie over de stand van zaken van het overleg met België. Tevens verzoekt u in te gaan op de relatie tussen die samenwerking en de aanschaf en het gebruik van de 37 F-35’s.

Inzetbaarheid 37 F-35 toestellen
Defensie kan met 37 F-35 toestellen 24 uur per dag, zeven dagen in de week het nationale luchtruim bewaken en vier toestellen langdurig uitzenden. Het kabinet acht dat ambitieus, maar haalbaar. De samenwerking met België is hierbij een belangrijk gegeven. Zonder die samenwerking zijn weliswaar ook vier toestellen voor uitzending beschikbaar, maar minder vliegers waardoor slechts één missie per dag kan worden uitgevoerd. Het voordeel van samenwerking komt vooral tot uitdrukking in het hogere aantal vliegers dat beschikbaar is om missies uit te voeren. Hieronder leg ik het beoogde voordeel van de samenwerking nader uit.

De inzetmogelijkheden van jachtvliegtuigen worden in hoofdzaak bepaald door het aantal beschikbare vliegers dat combat ready (inzet gereed) is. Dat aantal wordt bepaald door de andere taken die vliegers hebben, waaronder luchtruimbewaking en de noodzakelijke opleiding en training. Ook wordt de beschikbaarheid van vliegers bepaald door de wet- en regelgeving op het gebied van arbeidstijden. Het aantal beschikbare toestellen en de toegewezen vlieguren bepalen in dit geheel het aantal vliegers dat kan worden getraind.

Nederland verwerft 37 F-35 toestellen waarvan er permanent vijf in de Verenigde Staten blijven. Vier daarvan zijn bestemd voor de basisopleiding van vliegers en één voor testdoeleinden. In Nederland zullen dus 32 F-35 toestellen worden gestationeerd die beschikbaar zijn voor vervolgopleiding en training, luchtruim bewaking en inzet. Met deze 32 toestellen zullen jaarlijks 6.720 vlieguren worden gemaakt (gemiddeld 210 per toestel per jaar) waarmee 29 vliegers voldoende kunnen oefenen om een combat ready status te behouden. Uren worden ook gebruikt voor de opleiding van nieuwe vliegers en vervolgopleidingen. Een beperkt aantal uren gaat verloren omdat niet aan de trainingseisen wordt voldaan, bijvoorbeeld vanwege weersomstandigheden of beperkingen in het luchtruim. Met deze 29 combat ready vliegers moet Defensie 24 uur per dag en zeven dagen in de week het luchtruim bewaking én missies in een inzetgebied uitvoeren. Uiteraard moeten de vliegers voldoende oefenen om hun combat ready status niet te verliezen.

De luchtruimbewaking met jachtvliegtuigen en de benodigde training om de geoefendheid op peil te houden leggen gezamenlijk een fors beslag op het aantal vliegers. Wanneer Nederland dit alleen uitvoert, zijn vanwege de bepalingen in de Arbeidstijdenwet en de gemiddelde beschikbaarheid voor de luchtruimbewaking en de vanwege de benodigde training 24 vliegers in Nederland nodig. Van de 29 vliegers zijn er dan nog vijf beschikbaar om een internationale missie uit te voeren. Als met België wordt samengewerkt is het mogelijk de beslaglegging op vliegers te verlagen. Er zijn dan in Nederland permanent twintig vliegers nodig.

Van de 29 beschikbare vliegers zijn er dan negen beschikbaar om een internationale missie uit te voeren. Om meer missies op een dag te kunnen vliegen zijn per uitgezonden toestel twee vliegers nodig. Met negen vliegers kunnen daarom vier toestellen op deze wijze worden ingezet. De verwachting dat samenwerking tot een halvering van het aantal benodigde vliegers zou leiden, is ongegrond. Dit komt doordat het grootste deel van de vliegers in Nederland nodig is voor nationale training. In beide varianten zijn dat veertien of vijftien vliegers.

Als niet wordt samengewerkt met België kunnen de vijf beschikbare vliegers met vier toestellen één missie per dag vliegen. Ter vergelijking: Bij langdurige crisisbeheersingsoperaties kan de verhouding tussen vliegers en vliegtuigen in de praktijk lager liggen. Zo zijn in de afgelopen jaren gemiddeld rond de zes vliegers actief in Afghanistan voor de vier F-16’s die per dag nu gemiddeld één vlucht maken. Als wel wordt samengewerkt kunnen de negen beschikbare vliegers met vier toestellen meerdere missies op een dag vliegen.

Ten slotte
Ik hecht groot belang aan de samenwerking met België op het gebied van de luchtruimbewaking om zodoende de beschikbaarheid van vliegers voor internationale missies zo groot mogelijk te maken. Ik zal u op de hoogte houden van de relevante ontwikkelingen.

DE MINISTER VAN DEFENSIE
J.A. Hennis-Plasschaert

(ministerie van Defensie, 23 oktober 2013)

LETTER OF INTENT

BETWEEN

THE MINISTER OF DEFENCE OF THE KINGDOM OF BELGIUM
AND
THE MINISTER OF DEFENCE OF THE KINGDOM OF THE NETHERLANDS

CONCERNING BILATERAL COOPERATION IN INTEGRATED AIR POLICING

1. INTRODUCTION 
The Minister of Defence of the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the Minister of Defence of the Kingdom of Belgium, hereinafter referred to as the "Participants",

Considering the friendly relations between the two countries, including specifically in the area of cooperation in defence matters,

Considering the desire to further optimise the existing bilateral cooperation in the area of security and defence, also expressed in the 2012 Benelux Declaration on cooperation in the area of defence, and to strengthen the relations between the Ministry of Defence of the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the Ministry of Defence of the Kingdom of Belgium,

Considering that the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg is an important Benelux partner and signatory to the 2012 Benelux Declaration on cooperation in the area of defence,

Hereby express the following intention:

2. OBJECTIVE OF THE LETTER OF INTENT
With regard to their common goal and with regard to the general context as set out in this Letter of Intent (Lol), the Participants express their joint intention to achieve synergy and integration in the area of Air Policing, including Quick Reaction Alert and national Renegade tasks.

3. BACKGROUND
The challenges presented by the interaction between operational demands and available capabilities have led to the so-called Ghent Initiative, aiming at broadening cooperation in the area of defence bypooling and sharing resources. In view of this and in view of the shared desire to improve the efficiency of their defence efforts, the Participants have decided to build on the 2012 Benelux Declaration on cooperation in the area of defence. The Participants' shared goal is to enhance military effectiveness by increasing cooperation between their armed forces, by sharing costs where possible and by increasing output for the benefit of their operational capabilities.

4. SCOPE
, The scope of this Lol is to further optimise existing cooperation and to promote further interoperability and future capability development in order to:

- Achieve synergy and integration in the area of Air Policing, including Quick Reaction Alert and national Renegade tasks,
Initiate and actively continue the necessary preparations to achieve the aforementioned goal, the legal preparations for which are vital to the creation of a solid basis for the execution of the aforementioned combined and integrated Air Policing tasks.

The Participants agree that it is of the utmost importance to keep the Minister for Home Affairs and the Greater Region, the Minister of Defence of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg actively informed of this matter.

5. FINAL PROVISIONS
This Lol, which does not create any rights or obligations under international law, enters into force on the date of the final signature of this Lol.

This Lol may be amended at any time, in writing, with the mutual consent of the Participants and may be terminated by either Participant at any time.

Any disputes regarding the application, interpretation or implementation of this LO1 will be exclusively resolved by consultation and negotiations.

Drawn up in the English language and signed in duplicate:


THE MINISTER OF DEFENCE OF THE KINGDOM OF BELGIUM
Pieter DE CREM
Date: 23 October 201 3

THE MINISTER OF DEFENCE OF THE KINGDOM OF THE NETHERLANDS
Jeanine HENNIS-PLASSCHAERT
Date: 23 October 2013

The Dutch Cut NATO!

Alphen, Netherlands. 23 September - Last week in a “Defence Note” carefully buried in an announcement on the wider national budget The Netherlands cut some €370m (c$400m) from an already straitened defence budget. At the same time I gave a speech to senior NATO commanders in Riga, Latvia during Exercise Steadfast Pyramid and Pinnacle designed to test the credibility of the Alliance’s twenty-first century collective defence. My core message was blunt; the true test of NATO was that the good people of Riga could sleep soundly in their beds. However, to pass such a test NATO would need a twenty-first century defence built on twenty-first century forces. Even as I spoke I could feel the rug being pulled from under my feet by the Dutch decision.

The cut was sweetened by an announcement that the Netherlands will purchase 37 Joint Strike Fighters (JSF) worth some €4.5bn ($6bn) to replace ageing F-16s.  Back in 2010 I wrote a report entitled “Between the Polder and a Hard Place” together with Col Anne Tjepkema, formerly of the Royal Netherlands Air Force, for the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) in London. The report charted 14 Dutch defence cuts since 1991.  One of the report’s findings was that each Dutch defence cut has been sweetened by a commitment to purchase a new piece of military equipment. However, that commitment was either broken or watered down in a subsequent defence cut. Expect the same.

Since the end of the Cold War Dutch defence spending has fallen from 2.8% of gross domestic product (GDP) to 1.4% GDP and is planned to fall to 1.14% GDP by 2015. Indeed, if one removes Dutch Gendarmerie forces from the defence budget the figure is nearer 1% GDP or half of NATO’s agreed defence investment level of 2% GDP.  Moreover, according to the CIA the Netherlands ranks 92nd in comparative world military expenditure out of 173 states and 15th out of NATO’s 28 members. To be fair ‘superpower’ Germany comes in at 102nd and Canada 120th, but the rest comprise mainly minnows such as Albania, Belgium, Iceland, and Luxembourg.

The Dutch Government likes to hide behind the ‘little country’ alibi.  However, contrast the defence ranking of the Netherlands with its economic ranking and the extent to which the Dutch are defence free-riding becomes all too apparent. According to the CIA the Netherlands is Europe’s 6th largest economy, the world’s 24th largest by power purchase and the 7th largest trading power on the planet utterly reliant on open global sea and air lines of communication which have to be defended.

With the Americans stretched thin the world over NATO Europe must either be capable of going with the Americans or must credibly be able to act autonomously in and around Europe’s rough neighbourhood. Indeed, to keep NATO strong and America engaged Europeans must help the US to remain strong wherever and whenever. This is why the British will next year launch the first of two large aircraft carriers to project strategic power. If Europeans fail that test NATO will fade and eventually fail.

Defence Minister Jeanine Hennis-Plasschaert uttered forth the usual political platitudes whilst Foreign Minister Frans Timmermans suggested that in a meeting with US Secretary of State John Kerry the Americans had expressed satisfaction with the Dutch decision to buy JSF. My well-placed Washington sources tell me the Americans also expressed concerns about the defence cuts and their impact on NATO.

The only way for the Netherlands to squeeze military credibility out of their future force will be to enact radically deep synergies between the Royal Netherlands Army, Navy and Air Force. In effect they will need to become a single service.  The Hague will also have to seek defence integration with other states in a similar position, most notably Belgium. This will effectively mark the end of Dutch defence sovereignty.

Furthermore, given the rise in the cost of defence equipment the continual cuts to the Dutch defence equipment budget makes the size of the force the enemy of the cost of the equipment the force needs – a capability-capacity crunch.  Indeed, the Dutch are now struggling to afford any military capabilities hence only 37 JSF which is not a viable force.  ‘Not a viable force’ is an accusation that can now be levelled against the entirety of the Dutch armed forces as The Hague drives them below an irreducible level.

With proliferation of strategic weapons across a world full of friction the Dutch Government seems all too happy for the American, British and French taxpayers to bear the true cost of defending the Netherlands and its interests.  This is a tragedy because having worked with the Royal Netherlands Armed Forces I have witnessed first-hand the outstanding quality of Dutch personnel.

Will the people of Riga sleep sound in their bed?  Yes for now but not for much longer if countries like the Netherlands think their defence is someone else’s problem. The Dutch are cutting NATO.

Julian Lindley-French, 23 September 2013

The Future of the Dutch Armed Forces (summary)

The paper entitled 'In the interest of the Netherlands' sets out important decisions concerning the future of the Netherlands armed forces. The Netherlands government has opted for an armed forces that is sustainable, both from an operational and a financial point of view. This will ensure that the armed forces are future-proof and financially solid.

Having a high-quality armed forces is in the interests of the Netherlands and its allies. The threats and risks we face, both now and in the future, are diffuse. Having the ability to exercise escalation dominance is important—on land, at sea and in the air. In the future, the Netherlands armed forces will still be able to conduct all types of operations, both at home and abroad. Our participation in missions will, however, sometimes have to be limited to shorter periods of time than was previously possible.

Within the available budget, there will also be a strong focus on innovation and new investments. Examples are the replacement of the F-16 with the F-35 and the accelerated formation of the Cyber Command. We also put priority on intensifying our cooperation with international partners and national, non-military authorities. This will enhance the armed forces’ ability to take action.

In order to ensure that our finances are kept in order, the paper incorporates various reorganisations as well as a number of government-wide cutbacks. Given the importance we attach to innovation and high-tech materiel, the Ministry of Defence will continue to work towards bringing its annual investment percentage back up to 20 percent.  The combination of our current basic and niche capabilities forms a solid basis on which to build. Maintaining military niche capabilities is of great importance to the Netherlands, as there are shortfalls in certain niche capabilities within the EU and NATO. The niche capabilities to be maintained include the Patriot units, the Submarine Service and the German-Netherlands Corps Headquarters.

The paper also emphasises the role of the Ministry of Defence in the area of national security. One-third of our total military capacity is deployed on a daily basis for ensuring security in the Netherlands. This includes coastguard tasks, explosive ordnance disposal and specialist assistance to judicial authorities in tracking down and rounding up criminal networks.

There are three criteria to take into account when making choices between capabilities: usability, adaptability and durability. First: the armed forces must be able to achieve the required results in diverse circumstances and in various types of missions. This requires a sound balance between combat units and support units. In addition, the capabilities must be adaptable to rapidly changing (operational) circumstances. The greater the adaptability, the more extensive are our deployment options. Third: capabilities must continue to be deployable in the future under different circumstances.

The direction in which the Royal Netherlands Navy has been developing and its close cooperation with the Belgian navy will remain unchanged. The same applies to our surface fleet. The Air Defence and Command (ADC) frigates are among the most modern in the world. Due to their specific characteristics, the Walrus-class submarines will continue to be a relevant niche capability for NATO and the EU. The two Landing Platform Docks with embarked marines will form the core of our sea-based maritime combat power. However, the Joint Support Ship, which is currently under construction, will not be commissioned. Instead, the Ministry of Defence will procure a more basic and less expensive supply ship.
32 Marine Company in Aruba is to be disbanded. In future, the tasks in Aruba will be carried out by rotating units of the Royal Netherlands Navy and the Royal Netherlands Army, as is already the case in Curaçao.

The Royal Netherlands Army will continue to develop into a versatile, modular organisation. In future, the army will have mechanised, motorised and airmobile battalions at its disposal. A mechanised battalion is built around the modern CV90 tracked vehicle, while a motorised battalion is built around the Bushmaster wheeled vehicle and the open-top Mercedes Benz 280CDI. 45 Mechanised Infantry Battalion is to be disbanded, leaving a total of eight infantry battalions, six of which are part of the Royal Netherlands Army. The airmobile brigade will continue to be an important initial-entry capability for the army, also when operating in combination with the Special Forces Regiment. Our cooperation with the German army will be further enhanced by integrating the Airmobile Brigade with the Division Schnelle Kräfte. The three brigade headquarters in Havelte, Oirschot and Schaarsbergen will continue to enable the army to integrate individual modules into a national battalion task force (such as Task Force Uruzgan), as well as in an international context (such as a NATO Response Force or an EU Battle Group).

The German-Netherlands Corps Headquarters in Munster will develop further into a rapidly deployable joint headquarters, capable of directing combined land-based and air-based operations. A large part of the army consists of scarce ‘enablers’— such as combat support units and combat service support units—which work for all the operational commands.

In the past few years, the Royal Netherlands Air Force has proven once again to be an indispensable element of the armed forces. With the F-35, the Ministry of Defence has made a well-considered choice for a high-tech, future-oriented air force. From a military operational perspective, it offers the greatest number of options. It has been decided that the replacement of the F-16 will be carried out entirely within the previously reserved investment budget and the current operating budget. This will prevent budget displacement effects, which would sooner or later come at the cost of other capabilities. The deployability of our helicopters will be improved in the coming years by increasing the number of flying hours. Extra funds will be made available for that purpose. With regard to transport aircraft, the Ministry of Defence’s long-term aim is for full international integration of its air transport capability in order to create the economies of scale necessary in the long term for effective operations.

Finally, the tasks of the Royal Netherlands Marechaussee will remain unchanged but will be carried out differently. The territorial division of capabilities will no longer be a dominant factor. Instead, a mobile and flexible approach will be adopted, based on information-driven operations. Due to the measures being taken by the operational commands and a further reduction of the number of locations, there will be fewer military police tasks.

This set of measures will allow the Netherlands armed forces to fulfil our national and international responsibilities, both now and in the future.

(Ministry of Defence, 17 September 2013)

[Note: in the original version of this policy paper summary, the order is: Air Force - Navy - Army. This has been changed into the more traditional order, i.e. according to the century and year in which these components were established, HdV]

Dutch Navy on 'West Africa Business Tour'

THE ROYAL NETHERLANDS NAVY JOINS HANDS WITH NABC TO CREATE OPPORTUNITIES FOR DUTCH BUSINESSES IN WEST AFRICA

HNLMS Rotterdam

The West Africa Business Tour is organized by NABC in close cooperation with The Royal Netherlands Navy and the Dutch Embassies in the different countries. The navy ship HNLMS Rotterdam will be visiting the harbors of Casablanca, Dakar, Accra, Secondi, Cotonou, Lagos and Calabar in September and October 2013 as part of the military exercise “African Winds 2013”*. During this exercise NABC organizes high level business events in and trade missions to West-Africa’s main ports.

The presence of HNLMS Rotterdam is the perfect occasion to highlight and position Dutch excellence in many different sectors like onshore and offshore industries, water, agriculture, transport & logistics, and infrastructure.

PLANNING
Trade Mission Morocco
1-6 September 2013

Multisectoral Trade Mission Senegal
10-13 September 2013

Port Development Mission Ghana
25-28 September 2013

Benin
11-14 October 2013

Business Forum Nigeria
15-18 October 2013

(source & more information: NABC)

* African Winds 2013 is a multinational exercise in the framework of the Africa Partnership Station, a US-led program. Its main aim is 'to build maritime safety and security by increasing maritime awareness, response capabilities and infrastructure.' Participants in the exercise: The Netherlands, Spain, United Kingdom, United States of America.

Germany, Netherlands to enhance military cooperation

Declaration of Intent between the Federal Minister of Defence of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Minister of Defence of the Kingdom of the Netherlands on the further Enhancement of Bilateral Relations in the Field of Defence

The Federal Minister of Defence of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Minister of Defence of the Kingdom of the Netherlands hereinafter referred to as the “sides”, resolved to promote international stability and to secure peace in the spirit of the Charter of the United Nations and the North Atlantic Treaty and the Treaty on the European Union having regard to:

· the Declaration of Intent between the Federal Minister of Defence of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Minister of Defence of the Kingdom of the Netherlands on a New Approach towards Bilateral Defence Cooperation, June 19th 2002;

· the German-Netherlands Common Army Vision on Future Cooperation, April 6th 2005;

· the Memorandum of Understanding between the Federal Ministry of Defence of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Minister of Defence of the Kingdom of the Netherlands concerning defence materiel cooperation, August 29th 2006;

· the Agreement between the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands on bilateral defence cooperation, November 8th 2006;

· the Memorandum of Understanding between the Minister of Defence of the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the Federal Ministry of Defence of the Federal Republic of Germany concerning the Cooperation of the Armed Forces in the Field of Training, October 2nd 2008;

· the Letter of Intent between the Commander of the German Army and the Commander of the Royal Netherlands Army on Intensified Army Cooperation, July 12th 2012; welcome the very positive development in recent years of the traditionally excellent and friendly relations between Germany and the Netherlands. Both sides share the understanding that this Declaration of Intent will highlight and confirm their existing excellent relations and provide a sound basis for the even further enhancement of the German-Netherlands cooperation in the future.

The enhancement of German-Netherlands cooperation will comprise security, defence and armaments policy aspects, in order to represent common interests in an international environment in a coordinated, efficient and effective manner, including practical military cooperation between the Services. Furthermore, cooperation will be broadened in the areas of capabilities as well as operations, joint exercises and training. Bearing in mind that today’s security challenges can be tackled more effectively when working together, both sides explicitly welcome cooperation with additional partners.

Security, Defence and Armaments Policy
Both sides share common interests and values. These will remain the firm basis of their bilateral relations and be at the core of their enhanced cooperation in the future. Both sides intend to further strengthen the ability of NATO and the European Union to take action in matters of security, defence and armaments policy.

A vital condition for successful, viable and results-oriented German-Netherlands cooperation is a mutual understanding between partners and a shared view of the strategic challenges. Only on this foundation, will both sides succeed in defining common objectives, developing joint courses of action and identifying the required assets and capabilities.

Both sides will identify, discuss and strive for a common understanding of defence-related strategic and policy issues of common interest. They therefore intend to maintain close relations at defence ministers’ level and to continue their semi-annual bilateral security policy talks at Policy Directors’ level (High Level Steering Group).

Cooperation on Capabilities 
Multinational approaches as well as Pooling & Sharing are key instruments in closing capability gaps and in ensuring the provision of adequate military capabilities. Both sides strongly support the EU and NATO initiatives currently being pursued. The two sides underline that closer cooperation will improve efficiency in the area of capability development, thus creating a long-term advantage for both countries. All possibilities for bilateral cooperation will be exploited, within all areas of concept & capability development, command and control, combat as well as combat support and combat service support. Further progress must be made towards harmonizing the common analysis of future national capability needs. Both sides will additionally strive for an optimum resource allocation and cost-efficiency in all defence-related areas. Both sides will meet frequently at ministerial level to coordinate plans and to investigate new initiatives for cooperation on capabilities.

An enhanced cooperation and capability development is to be supported by military research and technology, defence procurement and the logistic support for all systems of interest. To strengthen cooperation on capability development, the National Capability Directors will meet when required. To strengthen armaments cooperation, the National Armaments Directors will meet every six months, moreover, a steering committee will be established for current activities.

Operations, Joint Exercises and Training
Past combined efforts of the German and Netherlands armed forces include operations in Kosovo (KFOR), in Afghanistan (ISAF including two rotations of the 1 (German/Netherlands) Corps as ISAF HQ, PRT and the Police Training Mission in Kunduz), off the Horn of Africa (EUNAVFOR ATALANTA) and in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (EUFOR). Of recent date is the cooperation in the PATRIOT deployment to Turkey (ACTIVE FENCE/ANATOLIAN PROTECTOR). In view of their many commonalities in their strategic and operational approach to multinational operations, both sides declare their willingness to intensify all possibilities for cooperation, particularly in future operations.

Combined joint training and exercises as well as the mutual exchange of innovative plans and products, knowledge and lessons learned will substantially improve mutual understanding between the Armies, Navies and Air Forces, as well as the Medical Services, contribute towards enhanced interoperability during joint UN, NATO or EU-led operations and ultimately increase the effectiveness of both sides’ armed forces. In this context, particular attention will be paid to common planning, preparations and pre-deployment training and exercises in case their forces are engaged in operations where multinational interaction and cooperation at operational and tactical level is required. Both nations intend to enhance the use of 1 (German/Netherlands) Corps as platform for combined training as well as the leading command and control element for multinational operations. Furthermore, the integration of 11 (Netherlands) Airmobile Brigade (11(NLD) LMB) into the German Division Schnelle Kräfte (DEU DSK) by January 2014 will enhance interoperability and common planning, preparations and pre-deployment training. The permanent posting of exchange officers at MoD level and at headquarters as well as the exchange of personnel in their national units and of instructors and students/cadets at military educational institutions are well-established procedures and extremely valuable in underlining the willingness to integrate. Both sides are prepared to examine further possibilities to exchange personnel.

Both sides express their desire to continue the established cooperation in operations, joint exercises and training. In order to coordinate, facilitate and further develop this cooperation, both sides agree that their Armies, Navies and Air Forces as well as Medical Services will continue to conduct their staff talks and explore opportunities for establishing more permanent forms of cooperation and deeper integration. These efforts should take into account the potential of integrated command and control structures on a permanent basis to ensure unity of command in operations and exercises. At Service level, units could be placed under common operational command and be deeply integrated on a permanent basis while remaining stationed at their peace-time locations.

Conclusion
Being firmly convinced that the further enhancement of their cooperation will contribute to improving their joint response to future challenges and threats and have a positive impact on European Security and Defence, the two sides declare their intent to:

· continue the mutually beneficial, professional and friendly partnership in the interest of both countries and,

· further enhance cooperation at ministerial level as well as between the armed forces regarding Security, Defence and Armaments Policy, Cooperation on Capabilities and Cooperation on Operations, Joint Exercises and Training, based on a reciprocal examination of opportunities and areas that are of mutual interest.

Roadmap
Following this firm commitment to further expand and deepen their cooperation in the defence field both sides agree on a roadmap of energetic steps to achieve tangible results. This roadmap, attached as an annex to this declaration, will be regarded as a living, non-limitative document, serving to evaluate the status and progress of the German-Netherlands cooperation in the field of defence at ministerial level.

Signed in duplicate
Dr. Thomas de Maizière                       Jeanine Hennis-Plasschaert
Federal Minister of Defence                 Minister of Defence
of the Federal Republic of Germany     of the Kingdom of the Netherlands

++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++

Annex: Roadmap for the Further Enhancement of the Bilateral Relations in the Field of Defence

Goals:

A. Intensify the German-Netherlands defence cooperation, considering the necessity to identify new options by frequent consultations in flexible, effective and efficient formats, enhance coordination and monitoring of the various cooperation projects and include aspects of operations as well as planning and concept development;

B. Develop a shared view on the strategic challenges in order to define our ambitions in the
field of Security, Defence and Armaments Policy;

C. Strive for harmonization of defence planning processes in general.

In addition to the enhancement of cooperation activities at ministerial level, as described in the declaration and the goals above, the following non-exhaustive overview identifies further areas of intensified cooperation – in particular at Service level:

Cooperation on Capabilities Projects:
All of the following topics are already integrated in Army, Navy or Air Force cooperation, but the involvement of MoD Plans and Policy Directorates as well as defence materiel organisations is needed to support decision-making. This paragraph also mentions fields of cooperation that cannot be attributed to one single inter-Service cooperation, as a result of the diverging task assignment within the DEU and NLD Armed Forces.

· Maintenance of ground-based systems. DEU and NLD use similar ground-based systems, such as the Boxer, Fennek and PzH 2000. It is worthwhile investigating possibilities for cooperation in the fields of maintenance and logistics for these systems. As for procurement, maintenance and phase-out of Army equipment, common interests and approaches should be investigated in an early stage of the process;

· DEU and NLD are both partners in the NH-90 programme and already work together within the established agencies. Possibilities of strengthening cooperation in the field of maintenance, education and training should be developed. If DEU decides to procure the NFH version of the NH-90, a trilateral cooperation with Belgium, for instance on common spare part pooling and management might be beneficial;

· DEU and NLD are both in the preparation phase for procurement of a MALE UAV. If both countries decide to acquire the same UAV system, this will create several opportunities for materiel cooperation, which can be exploited. In addition, other forms of cooperation in the field of UAVs, such as education, training and operational use, will be possible;

· DEU and NLD both have expertise in designing and building submarines. Shared knowledge and expertise can be used for the design and development of a new class of submarines for both countries;

· Replacement of Mine Countermeasures capability. Together with Belgium, knowledge acquisition and sharing, in the field of mine countermeasures in order to investigate common replacement of MCM capabilities;

· Development of a (sea-based) Missile Defence Capability on the basis of the SMART-L
Radar;

· Combined procurement and stockpiling of supporting equipment and clothing.

Army cooperation:

· Development of 1 (German-Netherlands) Corps in Münster into a Joint Task Force Headquarters Land (JTF HQ L)/Joint Command and Control Capability (JC2C). Furthermore, both nations should evaluate the possibility of providing 1 (German/Netherlands) Corps as a JTF HQ (L)/JC2C to NATO’s Long-Term Rotation Plan (LTRP) in the future.

· The DEU-NLD Common Army Vision on Future Cooperation of April 6th 2005 is the basis for cooperation between the two Armies. DEU-NLD Army staff talks take place as Army Steering Group (ASG) meetings at least twice a year. The ASG identifies new opportunities for cooperation and coordinates and monitors the execution of cooperation initiatives. The recent new initiatives and studies (Project Griffin) to intensify the DEUNLD Army cooperation will be the main priority of the DEU-NLD ASG for the upcoming years. Promising supervised initiatives are investigated with highest priority. Currently existing fields of cooperation - mainly training and exercises - will be deepened where possible.

· Prioritized initiatives are:
Development of a bi-national DEU-NLD Fire Support unit (FOC within 3-5 years);
Common Joint Fire Support training;
Integration of 11(NLD) LMB (ground component) into DEU DSK (January 2014);
Training of NLD units with DEU tank units;
Intensification of DEU-NLD Training & Exercise including UN Training and Para Training & Exercises.

· The intent of the ASG is to bring forward implementation proposals to the Chiefs of Staff of the Armies no later than June 2013. Agreed proposals for short-term implementation (2013-2014) will be forwarded to the High-Level Steering Group for approval at ministerial level.

· Fields for medium and long-term (Army) feasibility studies are: common logistic support, logistic role specialization, CIS interoperability, officer and NCO training, common Army vision on land warfare, common doctrine on land warfare, NLD participation in DEU division staffs, attachment of units to 1 (German/Netherlands) Corps, development of common organizational structures (support), cooperation in Electronic Warfare, engineering and C-IED.

Air Force cooperation:

· Further integration within the EATC.
· Continue the intensification of bilateral cooperation on Ground Based Air and Missile Defence (GBA&MD) between DEU Air Force and NLD Army, as defined in the Terms of Reference of the bi-national project group.
· Intensify the existing GBA&MD cooperation by
Strengthening the cooperation in the areas of operations, logistics and training;
Embedding individual NLD GBA&MD experts into DEU GBA&MD Wing 1 “Schleswig-Holstein” in 2014;
Common further development of GBA&MD tactical firing exercises;
Aiming at developing a common mission-oriented (not standing) binational GBA&MD unit.
· Cooperation on helicopter capabilities (cross-Service DEU and NLD Armies and Air Forces):
DEU Participation in the NLD Helicopter Weapons Instructor Course (HWIC);
Cooperation in the field of Helicopter Underslung Loads Equipment (HUSLE) and Underslung Load Clearance (ULC);
Contribution to the integration of 11(NLD) LMB (ground component) into DEU DSK (January 2014);
Mutual participation in certification exercises, when both countries contribute to the same operational readiness unit (IRF/NRF or EUBG).
· Cooperation in the field of Space Situational Awareness;
· Development of combined Survive, Evade, Resist & Extract (SERE) training and education, together with Belgium.

Navy cooperation:
Widening and intensifying the existing cooperation between the DEU and NLD Navies on a
broad basis, such as:
· Education & Training: PWO Course, Air Defence Course, Very Shallow Water Operations (via CoE CSW at Kiel and MBS Eguermin at Oostende);
· Shipbuilding & Design: sharing of knowledge and expertise with regard to feasibility, operational concepts, design and procurement studies on new weapon systems;
· Exchange of personnel on board operational units;
· Sharing of Lessons Identified/Learned from operations.

In order to expand and deepen the cooperation between both navies, bilateral working groups will be established concerning:
· Sharing of knowledge and capabilities in replenishment, seabasing and amphibious operations;
· Establishment of a multinational Submarine Command during Operations, Training, Education and Logistics;
· Sharing of training facilities and capabilities (i.e. Helicopter Controller Training, Submarine Training Centre);
· Co-ordination of annual Operational Programming of assets;
· Shared development of naval doctrine;
· Exchange of information and mutual support regarding the development of a maritime Ballistic Missile Defence capability;
· Exchange of knowledge and experience on the use of UAVs on board naval units;
· Medical Service: cooperation of Medical Teams during operations (i.e. ATALANTA).
Cooperation between Medical Services:
· Development of a modular Role 2/3 facility, based on the Smart Defence project 1.15 and further development of a Trauma Registry System from point of wounding until final treatment, based on the NATO Trauma Registry software, available since November 2012.
· Continuation of the training of bi-national medevac crews in the EATC cooperation;
· Pre-deployment training for bi-national medical teams or units to be deployed;
· NLD contribution to further development of DEU education and training approach (including observer/trainer system);
· Explore opportunities for the mutual use of training facilities;
· Exchange of information: continue exchange of information and experience in the field of Mil Mental Healthcare, Rehabilitation, quality control systems and MEDINT;
· Investigate sustainable provision of primary healthcare for military personnel of 1 (German/Netherlands) Corps in Münster;

Cooperation DEU Streitkräftebasis and NLD Command Service Centre:

· Intensification of cooperation between NLD Defence Academy (NLDA) and Führungsakademie der Bundeswehr (FüAkBw) as well as exchange of lecturers at the DEU and NLD General Staff Courses.
· Reciprocal examination of opportunities in the fields of ISTAR, CBRN and C-RAM is of mutual interest for both armed forces.
· Intensification of cooperation with regard to training in CBRN Defence. Investigation of options for mutual CBRN Defence capability development and CBRN Defence units.
· Further exploration of options to enhance the NATO CIMIC capability development through close cooperation of the CCOE framework nations DEU and NLD. Investigation of the possibility for setting up DEU-NLD CIMIC formations at tactical level and to conduct common training.

(ministerie van Defensie, 28 mei 2013)

Dutch FM remembers fallen US soldiers at the Netherlands American Cemetery

69 years ago, on a beautiful September Sunday, my mother and her parents were walking home after a family visit and were caught in the crossfire between German troops and American soldiers who were liberating Heerlen. After having been told to hide by GI’s, they ran into a house where they later had their first encounter with their liberators. My mother told me, the other day: “These boys, front line troops, were famished and ate the food offered to them with their fingers, straight from the frying pan.”

Dutch FM Frans Timmermans

In the months to come, the inhabitants of Heerlen would become very friendly with the American troops, my mother, six years of age, learning very quickly that she could trade small clippings of her red hair for big chunks of American chocolate. My great-aunt Clara fell in love with Pete Kotovic, a Polish-American soldier from Troy Michigan, who made her his bride. They went to Troy, had three children and more grandchildren, a great life, fulfilled when my aunt passed away last year.

I wanted to share this with you, because it is just a very small and personal testimony of the profound attachment this part of the Netherlands feels with the young American men and women who were prepared to risk their lives so that young Dutch men and women could live full lives in liberty, could become parents and grandparents, could pass on to next generations their memories of occupation and oppression, so that we would understand the true value of freedom.

In these fields lie the remains of more than 8,000 young men, boys often, who’s lives were cut short, who were denied the possibility to marry, to become fathers and grandfathers, to live life’s full circle. One of them is pfc  Leo Lichten, from Brooklyn, NY, twenty years old when he was mowed down by a German machine gun, less than twenty miles from here, across the border at Prummern. In the last letter he wrote, to his best friend Paul Slater, he stated that he was resigned to his fate and that he knew he was fighting the necessary fight against tyranny. This letter is one of the most moving testimonies of a young man willing to sacrifice everything, including his life, for liberty. Not at home, not in his country, but overseas, for us, for our freedom. We have adopted his grave as a small gesture of gratitude for his and his fellow soldiers’ sacrifice.

Netherlands American Cemetery and Memorial at Margraten 

100 Years after President Lincoln’s Gettysburg address, President Lynden B. Johnson made the following comments on Memorial Day. “Until the world knows no aggressors, until the arms of tyranny have been laid down, until freedom has risen up in every land, we shall maintain our vigil to make sure our sons who died on foreign fields shall not have died in vain. As we maintain the vigil of peace, we must remember that justice is a vigil, too--a vigil we must keep in our own streets and schools and among the lives of all our people--so that those who died here on their native soil shall not have died in vain…” How true these words ring today, with recent memories of terrorist attacks in Boston, London and Paris.

As I stand here to honor these heroes, I am compelled to also remember American diplomats who have died in the service of their country. In the last year alone five of them were killed in the line of duty. I’m thinking of Ambassador Chris Stevens who died in Benghazi months after our countries had helped to liberate Libya from the scourge of dictatorship. I’m thinking of Sean Smith, information management officer who was in Benghazi on a short assignment while posted in The Hague. I’m thinking of his wife Heather and their children Samantha and Nathan. I’m thinking of Anne Smedinghoff who was killed a few weeks ago while delivering textbooks to a school in Southern Afghanistan. These were courageous people, fighting the good fight for peace, liberty and justice worldwide. As SoS John Kerry said: “we send diplomats today, so that we do not need to send troops tomorrow.”

Let me finish with a few lines of poetry, written by Henry Wadsworth Longfellow

But in this camp of Death

No sound your slumber breaks;

Here is no fevered breath,

No wound that bleeds and aches.


All is repose and peace,

Untrampled lies the sod;

The shouts of battle cease,

It is the Truce of God!


Rest, comrades, rest and sleep!

The thoughts of men shall be

As sentinels to keep

Your rest from danger free.


Your silent tents of green

We deck with fragrant flowers

Yours has the suffering been,

The memory shall be ours.

(Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 27 May 2013)

No criminal inquiry in Srebrenica case

PRESS RELEASE

The Public Prosecution Service will not initiate a criminal inquiry against Messrs. Karremans (Commander Dutchbat III), Franken (Deputy Commander Dutchbat III) and Oosterveen (Human Resources Officer Dutchbat III). On the basis of intensive and conscientious examinations of the facts, the Public Prosecution Service decided that Karremans, Franken and Oosterveen cannot be held liable under criminal law for having been involved in the crimes committed by the Bosnian-Serbian army (VRS) in July 1995 in Srebrenica.

Report
On 5 July 2010, the Public Prosecution Service received a report concerning the involvement of Karremans, Franken and Oosterveen in offenses committed in Srebrenica in July 1995. The report had been filed following the death of Rizo Mustafic, Ibro Nuhanovic and Muhamed Nuhanovic and not the deaths of the other evacuees who perished after they had left the compound. In the report, Karremans, Franken and Oosterveen are accused of having removed afore-mentioned victims from the compound and of handing them over to the VRS knowing that this would eventually lead to their deaths. The VRS was under the command of Mladic.

Examination of the facts
Following the report, an examination of the facts was initiated. The reason for this examination was to judge – based on (already) available data and on data referred to in the report – whether with regard to Karremans, Franken and Oosterveen there was cause to initiate a criminal inquiry.

In 1998, the Public Prosecution Service conducted an inquiry into, among other matters, the criminal involvement of the Dutch military forces in the evacuation of the population in the Srebrenica enclave in July 1995. At the time, there was no evidence that the Dutch soldiers who formed part of Dutchbat III had been guilty of any offense while carrying out their supervising tasks.

Various sources referred to in the report as well as other available sources have been examined comprehensively for the existence of incriminating and exculpatory evidence with regard to the report.

An analysis was made of the context in which the imputable conduct took place and the legal scope against which this conduct should be assessed. Important sources which served as reference included: the defense report ‘Debriefing Srebrenica’ (October 1995), the ‘Accounts of the Facts Debriefing Srebrenica’ (22 September 1995), the NIOD report ‘Srebrenica, a ‘Safe’ Area’ (2002), the reports of the Secretary-General of the UN (November 1995 and November 1999), the testimonies rendered by the Dutch soldiers before the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the testimonies rendered in the civil proceedings of those who filed the report against the Dutch State. The inquiry has taken considerable time since the report was made in July 2010. Not only because of the huge quantity of data which was examined. This is also an extremely complex and sensitive case. At various moments, there has been extensive internal consultation of the sub-results of the inquiry and the analysis, and more detailed investigative instructions were formulated and executed. In addition to this, advice was obtained from a number of other departments of the Public Prosecution Service (National Office of the Public Prosecution Service, Office of the Prosecutor General and the Appeal Court Public Prosecution Office Arnhem- Leeuwarden).

Events around the Fall of Srebrenica
After Srebrenica was designated as a ‘safe area’ by the UN Security Council in 1993, an area in which the population was supposed to be safe from weapons and other threats, in the summer of 1993, the Dutch government appeared to be prepared to provide, for the duration of 18 months, an infantry battalion for the UN-Mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The first battalion (Dutchbat I) arrived in March 1994. In July of that year, this battalion was succeeded by Dutchbat II, which in turn was relieved by Dutchbat III in January 1995.

The tasks of Dutchbat were aimed at a traditional peace keeping mission, i.e. an operation in which the battling forces have made peace and the ‘blue helmets’ act as independent third parties. It was Dutchbat’s task to discourage battling forces to attack the safe area just by their presence in this area. The mandate did not provide for protection of the population by defending the safe area.

Neither Dutchbat, nor UNPROFOR and the international community proved to be capable to influence the developments during the months, weeks and days prior to the fall of the Srebrenica enclave, and to prevent the attack on the enclave or to stop it. The different investigations carried out in the course of the years into the events surrounding the fall of Srebrenica attribute this failure to a significant extent to a deficient mandate, faulty (international) political and military supervision, insufficient troops, light armament and the restrictions with respect to the use of violence.

After the VRS did not permit the entrance of fuel transports in the enclave in February 1995, Dutchbat faced serious fuel shortages. Also, applications for supply convoys were systematically hindered and at the end of April, the VRS even closed off the enclave hermetically. Because of this approximately 150 soldiers on leave were unable to return to the area and the delivery of supplies became impossible. Soon after, shortages of the barest necessities arose such as heating, lighting, warm water and bathing facilities. Also, drinking water and food supplies took on worrying proportions which led to various physical complaints of the soldiers which hindered their proper functioning. Since the UNHCR aid convoys were unable to reach the enclave anymore either, a very precarious food situation arose for the population in the enclave as well.

Early June, the first Observation Post (OP) fell into the hands of the VRS. After the enclave was attacked by the VRS on 6 July 1995, the other OPs were captured one after the other by the VRS, during which actions the VRS did not shy away from the use of violence. In many cases the men were forced to leave their weapons behind and a number of Dutch soldiers fell into the hands of the VRS. In the evening of 9 July 1995, the VRS had approached Sebrenica-city up to one kilometer.

Although on 10 July 1995, Dutchbat had placed themselves in different blocking positions, the VRS advanced incessantly. Despite several requests, air support failed to arrive. In the afternoon of 11 July 1995, air support arrived but was immediately stopped after the VRS had threatened to kill the Dutchbat soldiers who had been taken hostage. The VRS continued its advance and, using abundant violence, Srebrenica-city was captured in the late afternoon of 11 July 1995.

The consequence of the attack on the enclave was that the population and the units of the Bosnian Muslim Army (ARBiH) present in the enclave fled the enclave. In the course of the day, a large part of the population had found a safe haven in the Potocari compound.

Since the VRS threatened to use artillery fire if Dutchbat were to allow refugees into the compound, the refugees were entered, out of sight of the VRS, through a hole in the fence at the back side of the compound. Around 5000 refugees were housed in a large factory on the premises. The other refugees, approximately 27.000, remained outside the compound.

In view of the furtherance of the humanitarian situation for the refugees who were staying in and around the compound, in the early evening of 11 July 1995, Karremans received the instruction from Headquarters in Sarajevo to take every possible measure to protect the refugees. Shortly thereafter, he also got the instruction to start negotiations with the VRS concerning the evacuation of the refugees. In this respect, Karremans opted for an evacuation executed by UNPROFOR and, from the very start, he indicated that he wanted to take the local staff along. According to Karremans, Mladic made the requirement that the local staff would have to be in possession of a UN-pass. Upon this, Karremans instructed his staff to draw up a list of names.

In the early morning of 12 July 1995, Mladic unexpectedly stated that the VRS was to arrange for the transport. In addition to this, Mladic wanted to see all the men between the ages of 17 and 60 in order to determine whether there were any war criminals amongst them. Around 1.00 PM that day, the first busses and trucks arrived at the compound in Potocari and the first busses carrying refugees left. In addition, the VRS started to separate the men from their families. The men were taken to a house called ‘the White House’ where they were interrogated by the VRS. Quite soon, the battalion commander received reports which unmistakably indicated that (serious) physical violence was used by the VRS in that house.

The initial plan to have a Dutch soldier ride on each bus soon appeared not to be workable. The plan to send a military vehicle along with each convoy was frustrated by the VRS. The VRS took possession of weapons and vehicles that belonged to the Dutch soldiers. Dutchbat was powerless to do anything about that. Later that day it became clear to Karremans and Franken that the buses with the men did not arrive at the agreed destination. (Kladanj).

Around noon all refugees who had been staying outside the compound had left. Next the refugees who were still at the compound in Potocari were evacuated. Early in the evening these refugees had also left.

Criminal liability for being involved in taking the lives of the victims named in the report On the basis of the examination of the facts the Public Prosecution Service has formed the following picture of the events which took place on 13 July 1995 concerning Rizo Mustafic, Ibro Nuhanovic and Muhamed Nuhanovic and the role played by Karremans, Franken and Oosterveen in relation to these events.

Muhamed Nuhanovic
Muhamed Nuhanovic was the brother of Hasan Nuhanovic (who filed the report) and who was acting as interpreter for the monitoring mission of the United Nations (UNMO). Hasan Nuhanovic feared for the fate of his brother and was searching for a possibility to prevent that Muhamed Nuhanovic was forced to leave the compound. During the negotiations with Mladic, Karremans had made it a condition that the local personnel that was employed by the United Nations would leave the enclave together with Dutchbat. Karremans instructed his staff to draw up a list of names (the so-called “list of 29”) in order to set out clearly which persons were concerned. The VRS had demanded Dutchbat to submit a list of names. A Dutch UNMO officer was prepared to pretend that Muhamed Nuhanovic had been employed shortly before as a cleaner and therefore needed to be considered as a member of the staff who would enjoy the protection agreed upon by Mladic. In the morning of 13 July 1995, the Dutch UNMO officer handed the list to Franken. However, Franken did not want any names on the list of persons who did not possess the required documents that could prove their employment with the United Nations or another international organization.

Muhamed Nuhanovic did not possess such evidence. Franken instructed his staff to inquire whether it would be possible to produce a copy of a UN identity card at the compound. It appeared that this was not the case. Franken was seriously taking into account that the VRS would conduct an inspection and feared for reprisals in case of discovery of the forged document and consequently for the life of the local personnel who did possess a UN identity card.

In the eyes of the Public Prosecution Service, the given circumstances of that moment and the powerless position of Dutchbat justify the weighing up of interests made by Franken and the decision taken by him on the basis of these circumstances. For that reason Franken cannot be held liable under criminal law. The Public Prosecution Service has established that Karremans’ involvement in the events concerning Muhamed Nuhanovic has not been relevant and that Oosterveen’s involvement was nil. Therefore both cannot be held liable under criminal law either.

Ibro Nuhanovic
Ibro Nuhanovic was staying at the compound together with his wife and two sons, Hasan Nuhanovic (who filed the report) and Muhamed Nuhanovic. Together with two other refugees, Ibro Nuhanovic formed part of the refugee committee which assisted Karremans during the negotiations with Mladic concerning the evacuation of the refugees. On that occasion Mladic had given the impression that Ibro Nuhanovic had been granted safe-conduct and would therefore be allowed to stay at the compound. Franken pointed this out to Ibro Nuhanovic when early in the evening of 13 July 1995 he saw that Ibro Nuhanovic was heading towards the entrance gate of the compound together with his family and the last group of refugees. Ibro Nuhanovic did not want to let his wife and son leave without him and decided to leave the compound together with them. Oosterveen cannot be linked in any way to Ibro Nuhanovic’s departure from the compound. The Public Prosecution Service believes that Karremans, Franken and Oostveen have not committed any relevant unlawful actions in this respect. Ibro Nuhanovic’s decision to leave the compound can be traced back to the decision taken by Franken to not allow Muhamed Nuhanovic to evacuate together with Dutchbat. Now that this decision taken by Franken is not deemed to be culpable behavior, Karremans nor Franken can be held liable for Ibro Nuhanovic’s decision to leave the compound and his subsequent death within the scope of criminal law.

Rizo Mustafic
Rizo Mustafic together with his family had also taken refuge within the compound. He had been employed by the local government of Srebrenica (Opstina) and worked at the compound as an electrician. Considering the fact that he had been working for Dutchbat since the beginning of 1994, he had acquired a special position compared to other Opstina personnel.

Although Rizo Mustafic was employed by the Opstina and therefore not employed by the United Nations, there is some evidence that his name had been on the list of names and that Rizo Mustafic was aware of this. In the morning of 13 July 1995, Rizo Mustafic walked up to Oosterveen and they had a short conversation during which Rizo Mustafic made it clear that he would stay in the compound. Based on instructions which he had received earlier from the battalion commander, Oosterveen observed that only local staff which had been employed by the United Nations was entitled to stay in the compound. That same evening, after Rizo Mustafic had already left the compound and Oosterveen had informed Franken about their conversation of that morning, Franken told Oosterveen that Rizo Mustafic would have been allowed to stay in the compound. Franken considered Rizo Mustafic to be a local staff member who enjoyed special protection and he reproached Oosterveen for having made an enormous and stupid mistake.

Karremans did not see Rizo Mustafic during those days and only noticed his departure after 13 July 1995. Karremans considered Rizo Mustafic to be a permanent staff member and had not realized that Rizo Mustafic had not actually been employed by the United Nations. The events around Rizo Mustafic are due to a dramatic misunderstanding. Karremans, Franken and Oosterveen cannot be held liable for this misunderstanding under criminal law.

Conclusion
Based on the examination of the facts the Public Prosecution Service concludes that no criminal charges may be filed against Karremans, Franken and Oosterveen for having been involved in the killing of Rizo Mustafic, Ibro Nuhanovic and Muhamed Nuhanovic by the VRS. According to the opinion of the Public Prosecution Service there is no evidence which obliges them to conduct further (criminal) inquiries.

Meanwhile, the Court of Appeal in The Hague has ruled that the State of the Netherlands is liable for the death of Rizo Mustafic, Ibro Nuhanovic and Muhamed Nuhanovic under civil law, which judgment was contested in cassation, so therefore this judgment is not final yet.

Nevertheless, the nature of the examination which resulted in that judgment is essentially different from the examination in connection with the question whether any relevant charges may be filed against Karremans, Franken and Oosterveen individually under criminal law.

District Public Prosecutor’s Office / Netherlands East
7 March 2013)

Turkish, German and Dutch defense ministers visit Patriots deployed in Turkey

Turkish Defense Minister İsmet Yılmaz along with his German and Dutch counterparts visited the Patriot missile systems deployed from both countries in Adana and Kahramanmaraş near the Turkish-Syrian border on Feb. 23.

Germany's defense minister Thomas de Maizière said during the visit that they delivered a "clear warning" to Damascus that NATO would not tolerate missiles being fired into Turkey.

"Our presence here serves to make sure that Syria doesn't turn its capabilities into action," de Maizière said, while also saying that the risk of attack was "minimal".  "We can see from here that Syria is using rockets - often several times a day” he added.

Defence ministers De Maizière, Hennis-Plaschaert, Yilmaz
Photo: MoD, The Netherlands

German Chancellor Angela Merkel was scheduled to visit the same area on Sunday when she begins a two-day visit to Turkey.

Dutch Defense Minister Jeanine Hennis-Plasschaert reiterated that Holland was willing to fulfill its commitments as a member of NATO. “What is happening in Syria showed us that war could occur nearby in Europe. This is a very important fact [from the viewpoint of] our security concept. It is a situation that we should never forget. We have to take lessons from what we have observed in Mali, Libya and Syria,” she said.

The hosting minister Yılmaz stressed that his counterparts had come to Turkey upon the government’s invitation. He thanked both countries as well as the United States for having responded to NATO’s call, adding that deterrence has increased in the region thanks to the Patriot batteries.

Turkey requested help from its NATO allies after shells landed on its border areas from Syria in October 2012, killing a number of villagers.

NATO approved the deployment later that year in December, saying the use of ballistic missiles by the Syrian regime posed a threat to Turkey and insisting that the move to deploy Patriots was purely defensive.

(Hurriyet, 23 February 2013)

NATO Defence Ministers visit Patriot deployment

The German, Dutch and Turkish defence ministers paid a joint visit to NATO Patriot batteries in Turkey on Saturday 23 February, in a signal of Alliance solidarity.

The Turkish defence minister Ismet Yilmaz thanked Allies for their support. ''We are very pleased at how quickly NATO responded to our request to reinforce our air defences. I personally want to thank my fellow Ministers from Germany and the Netherlands for their important contribution,'' Mr Yilmaz said.

Dutch Patriot launcher, Turkey. Photo: MoD, The Netherlands

The three defence ministers visited both the Dutch and German patriot sites at Adana and Kahramanmaras during their two-day stay, and received an operational briefing from the Dutch and German Patriot commanders. They also met with local Turkish officials and officers.

The German defence minister Thomas de Maizière stressed the defensive nature of the deployment. ''The defensive nature of the mission is not only due to the NATO mandate, but also for technical reasons. The position and range of the Patriots makes it impossible to enforce a no-fly zone or attack Syria'', said Mr de Maiziere.

The Dutch defence minister Jeannine Hennis-Plasschaert said the joint visit demonstrated the Alliance’s resolve and solidarity. ''The strong solidarity that exists in NATO is very evident here today. The Netherlands are ready and pleased to serve and help our fellow Ally Turkey,'' Ms Hennis-Plasschaert said.

The ministers travelled to Turkey immediately after attending a defence ministerial in Brussels at NATO headquarters on Friday. The visit comes after the last of the deployed batteries became operational under NATO command and control on 15 February. Germany, the Netherlands and the United States provide two batteries each to augment Turkey’s air defences. The systems are deployed in Kahramanmaras, Adana, and Gaziantep.

(NATO, 23 February 2013)

Address by the Dutch Minister of Defence, Jeanine Hennis-Plasschaert, at the Munich Security Conference

From splendid national isolation towards an enhanced ability to act for all

Jeanine Hennis-Plasschaert

Ladies and gentlemen, friends, colleagues, A debate about the very foundations of trusted institutions is ongoing. Some say these foundations are shaking. The world economy has been facing its worst period in decades. Some say we tend to take our prosperity for granted. Military budget cuts are being made in many countries. Some say Europe is at risk of becoming irrelevant...

But ladies and gentlemen, I say this is an opportunity. It is up to us to turn the corner!

Like NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen stated last year: the financial crisis is one more reason why we should strive for greater military cooperation. And indeed! It is urgent for us to further optimize the efficiency and effectiveness of our armed forces to further enhance our ability to act.

Ladies and gentlemen, let me be frank. We do not need more headquarters. We do not need more civil servants. We do not need more bureaucracy.

In order to enhance our strength, to maximize the use of our capabilities and to optimize our combined operations, what we do need is leadership, long-term commitment and courage. A pragmatic bottom-up approach.

Of course, international cooperation is already a fact of life. All of us, gathered here today, share a history of combined military operations. And I believe that it is high time we took the next step. International cooperation is not free of obligations and we should start to act accordingly.

Ladies and gentlemen, for most countries, including the Netherlands, international cooperation is no longer a choice but a necessity. Our armed forces are - remarkably - well aware of this notion.

It is at the political level, rather, that we find obstacles to closer cooperation.

International cooperation is - still all too often - perceived as a limitation to sovereignty and national control and admittedly a factor that causes emotions to run high.

Most national parliaments tend to get increasingly involved, pushing more and more for a wide variety of strict conditions, under which our armed forces should operate.

Perfectly understandable as the lives of our men and women are on the line.

As a consequence, however, we are all too often dealing with too many national caveats within one single operation, undermining the efficiency and effectiveness of our missions.

Ladies and gentlemen, the question we have to ask ourselves is should we really fear the loss of sovereignty? Or should we define the concept of sovereignty in a less traditional way? And thus change our perspective?

When we consider our armed forces working effectively within the EU, within NATO, enhancing our ability to act in times of crisis, we can only conclude that international cooperation is beneficial to our sovereignty and security instead.

Ladies and Gentlemen, a different priority in the field of international military cooperation is for us to seriously align our collective requirements and national priorities. That goes for acquisition, training ánd logistical support.

If we are serious about preventing gaps in essential military capabilities, we should end the current practice of making military investments in 'splendid national isolation'.

Rather than counteracting each other, our respective national investments should complement each other. This is of crucial importance in order to, yet again, enhance our ability to act.

Ladies and gentlemen, we should not be afraid to critically address political decisionmaking processes, including the role of our national parliaments. We need to engage the members of parliaments in this debate.

They too should feel ownership when it comes to enhancing our strength, maximizing the use of our capabilities and optimizing our combined operations.

Their inclination to team up with fellow MP’s in partner countries has not yet been up to par with the standard set by our military professionals.

Ladies and gentlemen, in these times of shaking foundations, financial crises and military budget cuts, I would like to conclude by quoting a famous Belgian writer, Willem Elsschot: ”Between dreams and deeds, laws and practical objections remain.’’

Let us prove Elsschot wrong!

(Ministry of Defence, 3 February 2013)

NATO press briefing on the deployment of Patriot Missiles to Turkey

Press briefing on the deployment of Patriot Missiles to Turkey

by NATO Spokesperson Oana Lungescu and Brigadier General Gary Deakin, Director of SHAPE Strategic Operations Center

Good afternoon. Thank you very much for coming.

As you know, Patriot batteries from Germany, the Netherlands and the United States are now only days away from becoming operational in Turkey so we thought it would be timely to have a technical briefing today to explain the sequence of events that will eventually see NATO take control of these defensive batteries to help protect Turkey’s population and territory.

Let me just remind you briefly that in response to Turkey’s request, NATO Defence Ministers decided on the 4th of December last year to augment Turkey’s air defence capabilities in order to defend the population and territory of Turkey and to contribute to the de-escalation of the crisis along the Alliance’s border.

The deployment of the Patriots will be defensive only, but it sends a very strong signal of Allied solidarity.
I am very happy to introduce to you our briefer from SHAPE (Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe), Brigadier Gary Deakin, who is the Director of the Strategic Operations Centre at SHAPE who will take us through this NATO effort and will explain how the batteries will be brought under NATO Command and control in the coming weeks.

The Brigadier will speak on the record, and if you have any specific technical questions on the systems, the Brigadier will explain any arrangements we have. We have got some staff officers on hand who will be able to help with answers on background after this briefing is over.
Brigadier…

Brigadier General Gary Deakin (Director of SHAPE Strategic Operations Centre): Thank you very much, Oana. Good afternoon, everybody. If I can just begin with a little bit more detail on myself. I'm obviously a British Army officer and I'm employed down in Allied Command Operations, coordinating operations at the strategic level. So when the strategic direction came from the NAC to SACEUR to deploy assets to augment Turkey air defence then the task came to my organization to make the plan.

I've got a number of experts who are with me. There are three officers in the front row here who are absolute technical experts on the detail of the systems, and so afterwards there's an opportunity... where there's a really difficult question that I can't answer, then they're ready to help out.

And my aim will be to really tell you the story as we see it right now, where we've come from and where we are at the moment, and then where we see this augmentation of Turkey's air defence going to.

And currently, it's all going according to plan which is really excellent news from our perspective.

Firstly, some context. The deployment is part of a plan that we already have. We have a standing defence plan for the air policing of NATO. And so this is not anything spectacularly new for us. The augmentation of Turkey's already robust air defence was an extra. It was within a framework of business that we already do.

We've also done this before, and indeed, The deployed to support Turkey's air defence in 1991 and 2003. So it's not... it's not new and in that way we've been able to carry out this mission quickly to provide support to the Ally as requested.

Now, we've... when the strategic direction was given to us at the beginning of December, after the Foreign Ministers meeting, SACEUR immediately set about generating the forces required and we were very fortunate to have Germany, Netherlands and the U.S. offer Patriot batteries to deploy as soon as possible to Turkey to provide this extra support. And we also stood up the NATO communications agencies to provide the CIS, the Communications Information System support to the Patriots so they could plug into the NATO Command and Control network.

So the mobilization commenced almost as soon as we got the direction. And you will have observed that the U.S. were the first to deploy assets into theatre by air, into Incirlik, which we know is the air point of disembarkation. And their initial package arrived at the beginning of January.

And then The Netherlands and Germany sailed their assets from ports in Northern Europe some two weeks ago now and as you'll be probably tracking today, they've arrived now in Iskenderun in Turkey; are unloading and unloaded and are moving out to their positions.

We expect to have an initial operating capability this weekend. That's what we're aiming at. And so it'll be confirmed at the weekend, but we're aiming for initial operating capability this weekend.

What do I mean by initial operating capability? This is where we'll have the ability... NATO will have the ability to defend some aspects of the population of what we're going to actually cover in the big picture. The first units will arrive on station. They will plug into the NATO Command and Control network and they will be then ready to defend the population. So that's what we're calling initial operating capability.

The full capability we expect to deliver... we're aiming to deliver, at the end of the month. That's our aim and that's when we'll have all the patriots in and complete. All the sustainment mechanisms in and the whole organization plugged into the NATO CIS coordinated with Turkey's air defence to provide the support... the NATO support to Turkey as requested.

And currently all that is on track.

And so The Netherlands are going to deploy to Adana. The Germans are going to deploy to Kahramanmaras—apologies for the mispronunciation—and the U.S. are going to deploy to Gaziantep. And those locations were decided in close coordination with our Turkish Allies based on the size of the population, how we could get the equipment to get the best effect. A number of factors were considered to get the best deployment options with the resources available from the nations that made the offers in this case.

So it was a very detailed process in close collaboration with our Allies to get the right lay-down of the forces that are deploying.

We estimate that once it's in place at those locations that we will provide protection against missiles for up to 3.5 million people, is our current assessment. So 3.5 million Turkish people under the protection of this missile defence capability in support of Turkey's air defence.

And I'd also emphasize again, I mentioned a couple of minutes ago about the CIS aspects. Lots of nations involved in that. There'll be NATO detatchments each location, providing the communication support, so a lot of nations involved, not just those from the contributing nations, and they'll provide that support to enable the command and control of the Patriots.

So that's where we are right now. We're just heading towards our initial operating capability, aiming to have the whole thing set up by the end of the month.

Now let me just, briefly I think, explain the capabilities of the system so you can then come back with some questions.

So a Patriot battery has got four main elements. It's a multi-function radar, which performs search identification and tracks potential targets. It's an air engagement control station and this is the only manned piece of equipment in the battery. And its responsibility is to make sure all the other systems are working and that the identification and engagement of targets is correct and in line with the procedures.

And the Patriot operators sit in this station and they're able to terminate an engagement, and control the engagement as required.

The battery then has a number of launches and this can be between four and six, depending on the mission and depending on which nation has made the contribution.

And then each missile, each launcher has a number of missiles, and again, depending on the nation, but up to 16, with a variety of different types of missiles. In this case we'll focus on destroying targets which are missiles. That is the way that this has been put together in this mission's case.

So those batteries, two in each location, as I've just described, are all connected together, so all six are together, and they're then connected directly to Air Command Ramstein in Germany. That's the operational commander, General Breedlove. And they're plugged into a Command and Control Centre there. And that Command and Control Centre is also... has situational awareness of what is happening in the region in terms of missile firings or early warning. So we're able to identify when there's some sort of missile fired that alerts the Patriot batteries, and then they can then observe the arcs that they've got in their azimuth and react accordingly if a missile is a threat to the population in that particular area that they're deployed to.

I think another point I just wish to really stress, which is really important, is the Command and Control goes to Ramstein, but there's a piece of detailed coordination into what we call the Combined Air and Operations Centre, which is in Eskisehir in Turkey. And it's there at the coordination is carried out with all the air that's going on. So to make sure that there's no risk of any accident, so that it's all very carefully controlled and coordinated.

So the air space is managed correctly. And again, this is, as I said at the beginning, this is normal business for us. There's nothing new here. We're used to this and there are procedures that are in place and it'll be correctly controlled and coordinated to make sure that there is no risk of any sort of accident.

Okay, I think that sort of covers the key points in terms of the lay down. I think hopefully I've described the... when it comes to it that the whole thing is set up and ready and we'll be ready, working very, very closely to our Turkish Allies in terms of augmenting their air defence to provide that defence to 3.5 million people. And should there be an alert on the early warning system, that will go to the Patriots and the Patriots from the nations will be ready to intercept and defend as required. And we're expecting the initial capability this weekend, that's what we're aiming at, and then we're aiming for the full capability by the end of the month.

And our current plans, and from my perspective sitting in operations, Admiral Stavridis's Operation Centre down in SHAPE, we're sort of initially planning that this will probably last for a year at least, and that's our commitment. That's what nations have said that they're prepared to commit to. Of course, there'll be decisions that may reduce that or extend it, but from our planning perspective we're planning to sustain this mission as required to augment Turkey's air defence.

If I can just clarify one really important point and that is, we're very closely integrated with the Turkish Allies in terms of the chain of command at all levels. So we have a very close relationship through each level of command, from the battery... and what I mean by that, the Patriot battery is located in an area where the Turkish military commander is going to provide him with some local support, et cetera, all the way then through to the coordination centre in the CAOC and then there are Turkish liaison officers who have gone to Air Ramstein and Air Ramstein has put liaison officers into the Turkish chain of command.

And in my own organization down in Mons, I also have liaison officers who have come from the Turkish General Staff to make sure that we've absolutely got the integration correct through all the different levels.

I think I've hopefully said enough, painted a little bit of a picture of what it looks like, where we are, and where we're going. I now stand ready to answer any questions and as I said, I've got a team to help.

Oana Lungescu (NATO Spokesperson): And as usual, please don't forget to introduce yourselves and we'll start with German Television. Just wait for the microphone Kai.

Q: I just have the question whether the whole area is now covered by the Patriots? Are there enough Patriots to cover the long borderline between Syria and Turkey? And would there... would there be the possibility to impact a No-Fly Zone if wanted with the Patriots that are at this border at the moment?

Brigadier General Gary Deakin: Okay, well, firstly the whole... Turkey's border is 900 kilometres long, so the coverage is not... will not cover the border. We're aiming at what we can with the capabilities provided, so we've got as much coverage of the population with the capabilities that nations have offered, and our assessment is that 3.5 million people in the south-western corner, southern part of Turkey over those cities and those areas that I've explained.

We don't have the capabilities to provide it extensively in the area you just described.

The capability is not being deployed at all to have anything to do with a No-Fly Zone. It's completely defensive. And it couldn't be transitioned to do so at this time. The capability is not set for that. It's not designed. The orders are not in line with that and that's what we've set out to do. It's a purely defensive mission in order to deter and hopefully deescalate and provide protection to those 3.5 million people and support our NATO Ally.

Oana Lungescu: Dutch News Agency. Over there.

Q: Sorry, it wasn't me.

Q: Hi, Robert Blumen of the Dutch Press Agency. I've got a question about initial capacity. Will there be a difference between the Dutch, German and American Patriots so that the Dutch will start, or will it be in general the initial capacity on Saturday/Sunday? You get the question?

Brigadier General Gary Deakin: Yes, yes, I understand, yes. They're very similar in terms of capacity. So the initial capability is arriving, setting up, plugging into the system, having the CIS working, being part of the whole process. That is very similar to each of the nations.

There are minor differences in terms of capabilities and going through sort of start-up procedures. But that's very, very technical and perhaps you could... you know, if you want to come back off line with the experts to clarify. But broadly it's much the same.

Q: (Inaudible...).

Brigadier General Gary Deakin: Oh no, no, no. Sorry, just to be absolutely clear. No, we currently see... I think The Netherlands will be the first to provide initial operation capability this weekend. And this is all to do with plugging in the communications technology, the site preparation, getting the sites prepared and our Turkish Allies have done a fantastic job in preparing the ground. You can imagine, you need level ground, you need shelters, you need things to put things in, and it just so happens in The Netherlands case all those things are aligning quite well. In the others it's still a little way to go to get those things completed.

Oana Lungescu: Reuters.

Q: Yes, Brigadier could you just confirm what you mean by initial operating capability? That means that the Patriot batteries, some of them, would be in place and ready to fire if necessary by this weekend, is that correct?

Brigadier General Gary Deakin: Yes. Yes, that is our aim, to have initial capability, which means we can defend with that system in place and we're aiming for this weekend. /2