Speech by Prime Minister Mark Rutte at the NATO Parliamentary Assembly Annual Session

Speech by Prime Minister Mark Rutte at the NATO Parliamentary Assembly Annual Session, The Hague, 24 November 2014.

Ladies and gentlemen,

It is an honour to speak to you here in my home city at the 60th Annual Session of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly. I hope that over the past few days we’ve shown how much we appreciate your coming to our country.

I would like to extend a special welcome to Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg. Jens, I know you as someone who works hard to build support and get results. You have the ability to strike a balance between consultation and action. So you’re the right man for the job and I look forward to working with you.

Being NATO Secretary-General is, of course, a magnificent job. Even so, the first person to hold the post, Lord Hastings Ismay, had to be talked into accepting it in 1952 by none other than Winston Churchill. As a military man, Ismay was concerned that there would be too much red tape and too little action. But Churchill won him over by saying – and I quote – ‘…that NATO provided the best, if not the only, hope of peace in our time’.

And that’s exactly what NATO has been since it began 65 years ago: our best hope for peace and security. That’s still true today, especially now that Europe is faced with an arc of instability that is much wider than we once thought. Many people are talking of a new reality, of a new north-south divide, even of a new cold war.

And while I don’t think it wise in today’s multipolar world to draw simple historical parallels, one thing is certain: things are happening fast on the eastern and southern edges of NATO’s European territory.  And the changes in geopolitical relations will last for a long time to come.

Think back to last year. Who could have imagined Russia’s aggression in Ukraine? Or such violent Islamic fundamentalism right on NATO’s doorstep? Almost every day, we are confronted with the fact that we cannot take peace and security for granted. The way we live − in democracies governed by the rule of law − is at stake.

NATO has made a substantial contribution to peace, security and prosperity in Europe. For 65 years, it has been a key defender of the norms and values we cherish as Western allies. Outside its own territory, too. Because if we want to protect our freedoms and civil rights we have to go beyond our own borders.

We have to join forces globally, by helping to maintain the international legal order. That’s in our own interests too, of course. By exporting stability, we limit the chances of importing instability. And NATO has a role to play here – along with the UN, the OSCE, the EU and other international organisations. Because global threats demand a global response.

I’m glad that NATO has responded appropriately to Russia’s aggression towards Ukraine and the recent developments in North Africa and the Middle East. For the Netherlands, NATO’s added value is not in question. Quite the opposite. We’ve seen recently, once again, how transatlantic cooperation provides the security guarantees that Europe needs to make it a relatively stable continent. How would countries like Poland and the Baltic States have felt in recent months without that collective security umbrella? Defending NATO’s territory is still the mainstay of our alliance. So it’s good that we re-affirmed this principle in a joint declaration at the recent summit in Wales.

The Netherlands will of course continue its active contribution to NATO’s efforts. That applies not only to Operation Resolute Support in Afghanistan and the immediate assurance measures we decided on earlier this year. It also applies to strategic decisions for the longer term, like investing in cyber security and ballistic missile defence, agreeing on the Readiness Action Plan, and setting up the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force.

Our priorities for the months ahead are clear. It’s also clear that these activities will cost a lot of money. More than is now available, in fact. So it’s good that we decided in Wales to boost our defence spending over the next ten years.

This is necessary, but it imposes a duty on us. A duty to show our taxpayers that their money is being spent smartly and effectively. Not only when it comes to national defence budgets, but NATO’s budget too. NATO is already working to make its financial affairs more transparent. And I sincerely hope that the 28 member countries can make further agreements on this in the future. After all, transparency and public support go hand in hand.

Ladies and gentlemen, as ‘our best hope for peace’, NATO deserves that support. So let’s continue to build on that together. Let’s continue to build on our broad transatlantic security agenda and make ourselves resilient to the threats of today, tomorrow and beyond.

Thank you.

(Source)

NATO SG: "Time has come to stop defence cuts"

Keynote address

by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg at the 60th Plenary Session of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly in The Hague

24 Nov. 2014Mr. President,

Distinguished members of parliament,

Ladies and Gentlemen,

Thank you for that very kind welcome.  It is a pleasure to be here at the NATO Parliamentary Assembly.  For more than 20 years, I was elected to serve my constituents as a proud member of the Norwegian Parliament until I became Secretary General of NATO.

That experience taught me the true value of Parliaments.  To hold governments to account.  Ensure that tax payers’ money is well  spent.  And that the views of the people  are heard.  

This is my first opportunity to speak with you.  But it will not be my last.  I intend to meet with you regularly.  To consult with you and seek your ideas. This is important to me.

Today, NATO needs your support more than ever.

We are working hard to turn the decisions we took at the Wales Summit into reality.

On my first day in office, I outlined my three priorities.

To keep NATO strong as a political and a military Alliance.

To work with our partners to bring more stability to our neighbourhood.

And  to keep the bond between Europe and North America rock-solid.

Each of these priorities requires financial resources, underpinned by political will.

But without them, there can be no security. And without security there can be little else.  No safety.  No prosperity.  No freedom.

The link you provide to our parliaments and our citizens is vital for NATO.  This is why today I would like to discuss with you core issue: keeping the defence pledge that we made at the Wales Summit.  

With the end of the Cold War, the world changed. And defence budgets were cut.  As people – rightly – demanded a peace dividend.  With no imminent territorial threat, this made sense.  Later, with the financial crisis, the cuts became even deeper.  

We have gone from standing armies to smaller, deployable forces.  From a NATO command structure of 22,000 to less than 9,000.  And from over 33,000 tanks, to less than 7,000.

We have also postponed new investments. Reduced our exercises. And cut back on the maintenance of equipment.

I’m not arguing that we need to return to where we were. And have exactly the same forces, capabilities and structures.

But  once more, our world has changed.

To our East, Russia is trying to replace the rule of law with the rule of force.

To our South, we also see the terrible human cost of conflict. We see violence and extremism across North Africa and the Middle East.  And we continue to face many other challenges – from missile proliferation to cyber attacks.

We must face up to these changes.  We must have more and better equipped armed forces.  We must have the right balance of forces and capabilities.

Let me be clear. This is not just an exercise in accountancy. The stakes are high. The  threats are real.

So we must redouble our efforts to resource our Alliance.

The Readiness Action Plan we adopted at the Wales Summit is the most significant strengthening of our collective defence.  It will help us deal with threats from wherever they come.

From the east or the south.

So it is vital that we implement the plan on time and in full.

A key part of it is the new ‘Spearhead Force’.  A very high readiness force able to react quickly.  With a command and control presence in the Eastern part of our Alliance.    And a demanding new exercise programme.   So we can have the right forces, in the right place, at the right time.

At Wales, we also decided to launch a new mission in Afghanistan. To train, advise and assist the Afghan Security Forces from January.

And we also decided to increase our support for  our partners, such as Iraq, to build their own defence capacity if they request it.  And project stability in our neighbourhood.

All these efforts  must  be properly resourced.

And our military needs long term investment and political support.  For readiness comes at a cost.

If we look around the world, while NATO has cut defence spending, others have rapidly increased it.  Over the last 5 years, Russia increased its spending by fifty percent.   And it plans further increases.

At the same time, total NATO defence spending fell by twenty percent.  And some nations are cutting further.

In more peaceful times, it was right to reduce defence spending.   But we do not live in peaceful times. So it is right to stop the cuts and to increase investment in our defence.

This is not  just about  NATO in comparison to the rest of the world.  It is also about the balance within NATO. And within Europe.

All Allies are expected to shoulder their fair share of the burden. In terms of spending, in terms of capabilities, and in terms of contributing to our operations.

The GDP of the United States and that of Europe is almost exactly the same.  Yet the United States spends more than twice as much on defence than all the other Allies combined. Providing over two thirds of total defence spending by NATO Allies.

For all these reasons, at our Wales Summit, we agreed to invest in our collective defence.  And to have a more balanced sharing of costs and responsibilities.  We made a joint pledge:

To stop the cuts

To increase spending in real terms as our economies improve

To aim to spend 2% of GDP on defence within a decade

To spend better

And to deliver the capabilities we need.

We also agreed that progress will be reviewed annually. We will start at the meeting of defence ministers in June. And we will also place it on the agenda of future summits.

By the Warsaw Summit in 2016, we must show progress.  And a way forward to further improvement in the years ahead.  So we need to make the best of the time we have.

I know that increasing defence spending is not easy.   But it is possible. Step by step. And every step counts. Starting now.

The United States, the United Kingdom, Greece and Estonia are already meeting the 2 % guideline.  And other Allies have outlined their own roadmap to get there.  

Of course, this is not just about how much money we spend on defence. It’s also about what we spend that money on.  And how we spend it.

At Wales, we committed to spending 20% of defence budgets on new equipment, including research and development, within a decade.

We have identified specific areas where we need to improve our capabilities.  Such as ballistic missile defence, training and exercises, and fully equipping our land forces.

We must make progress in all of these areas.  To ensure that our forces remain strong and able to deploy at short notice.

NATO can really add value when it comes to how defence budgets are spent   By helping Allies to align their priorities, to plan together, pool their resources, and get the most for tax-payers money.

There are many examples of how we’re doing just this.

For example, the new system of drones and other capabilities that make up the Alliance Ground Surveillance system.  Operated and maintained by NATO.  Giving our commanders a comprehensive picture of the situation on the ground.

Or the Framework Nations Concept agreed at Wales.  Where groups of European Allies work together to develop particular forces or capabilities, guided by a lead nation.

And here in the Netherlands, we are in a country that is a prime example of regional cooperation.   Dutch armed forces cooperate closely with their counterparts in Belgium, Luxemburg, Germany and the United Kingdom. Naval forces combine with Belgian naval forces under a single Admiral.

Allies gain a great deal from Smart Defence and other types of multinational cooperation.  Getting the most out of every dollar, euro and pound.

But this is not a substitute for more resources. We cannot do more with less indefinitely.  And defence cannot take an excessive share of the austerity burden.

We must be clear with our publics about why we need to increase defence investment.  And we must continue our efforts towards greater transparency.

When it comes to NATO’s own budget, Allies maintain full control over how much and how effectively tax-payers’ money is spent in the interest of our shared security. The budget is rigorously audited by an independent team of auditors. And this independent board regularly reports to the North Atlantic Council.

Allies review all reports. And all unclassified reports are now published on the NATO website. I also intend to continue publishing an annual report on everything that NATO does, including defence spending.  

Ladies and gentlemen,

The time has come to stop defence cuts. We must invest more in defence and spend our money better. And you, the parliamentarians, play a vital role in fulfilling the defence pledge we made at the Wales Summit.

This is first time that heads of state and government have made such a pledge.  And it is a pledge that we must honour.

Defence investment in times of austerity calls for hard choices at home. In every government. And in every parliament.

It is my responsibility to work with you to implement what was decided. And I am personally committed to this.

We all need to work hard. And we will all be judged on the progress we make.

So I need you to make the case at home. To speak up for defence.  To increase the momentum for more defence spending. To reach out across the political spectrum.  And to persuade your constituents of the value of defence investment.

If we fulfil the Defence Pledge that we made at Wales, we will keep ourselves safe.  And, working with others, we will help to keep peace around the world.

So we have much to do together.   And I thank you for your support.

Thank you.

(Source) (audio)

The Dutch Cut NATO!

Alphen, Netherlands. 23 September - Last week in a “Defence Note” carefully buried in an announcement on the wider national budget The Netherlands cut some €370m (c$400m) from an already straitened defence budget. At the same time I gave a speech to senior NATO commanders in Riga, Latvia during Exercise Steadfast Pyramid and Pinnacle designed to test the credibility of the Alliance’s twenty-first century collective defence. My core message was blunt; the true test of NATO was that the good people of Riga could sleep soundly in their beds. However, to pass such a test NATO would need a twenty-first century defence built on twenty-first century forces. Even as I spoke I could feel the rug being pulled from under my feet by the Dutch decision.

The cut was sweetened by an announcement that the Netherlands will purchase 37 Joint Strike Fighters (JSF) worth some €4.5bn ($6bn) to replace ageing F-16s.  Back in 2010 I wrote a report entitled “Between the Polder and a Hard Place” together with Col Anne Tjepkema, formerly of the Royal Netherlands Air Force, for the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) in London. The report charted 14 Dutch defence cuts since 1991.  One of the report’s findings was that each Dutch defence cut has been sweetened by a commitment to purchase a new piece of military equipment. However, that commitment was either broken or watered down in a subsequent defence cut. Expect the same.

Since the end of the Cold War Dutch defence spending has fallen from 2.8% of gross domestic product (GDP) to 1.4% GDP and is planned to fall to 1.14% GDP by 2015. Indeed, if one removes Dutch Gendarmerie forces from the defence budget the figure is nearer 1% GDP or half of NATO’s agreed defence investment level of 2% GDP.  Moreover, according to the CIA the Netherlands ranks 92nd in comparative world military expenditure out of 173 states and 15th out of NATO’s 28 members. To be fair ‘superpower’ Germany comes in at 102nd and Canada 120th, but the rest comprise mainly minnows such as Albania, Belgium, Iceland, and Luxembourg.

The Dutch Government likes to hide behind the ‘little country’ alibi.  However, contrast the defence ranking of the Netherlands with its economic ranking and the extent to which the Dutch are defence free-riding becomes all too apparent. According to the CIA the Netherlands is Europe’s 6th largest economy, the world’s 24th largest by power purchase and the 7th largest trading power on the planet utterly reliant on open global sea and air lines of communication which have to be defended.

With the Americans stretched thin the world over NATO Europe must either be capable of going with the Americans or must credibly be able to act autonomously in and around Europe’s rough neighbourhood. Indeed, to keep NATO strong and America engaged Europeans must help the US to remain strong wherever and whenever. This is why the British will next year launch the first of two large aircraft carriers to project strategic power. If Europeans fail that test NATO will fade and eventually fail.

Defence Minister Jeanine Hennis-Plasschaert uttered forth the usual political platitudes whilst Foreign Minister Frans Timmermans suggested that in a meeting with US Secretary of State John Kerry the Americans had expressed satisfaction with the Dutch decision to buy JSF. My well-placed Washington sources tell me the Americans also expressed concerns about the defence cuts and their impact on NATO.

The only way for the Netherlands to squeeze military credibility out of their future force will be to enact radically deep synergies between the Royal Netherlands Army, Navy and Air Force. In effect they will need to become a single service.  The Hague will also have to seek defence integration with other states in a similar position, most notably Belgium. This will effectively mark the end of Dutch defence sovereignty.

Furthermore, given the rise in the cost of defence equipment the continual cuts to the Dutch defence equipment budget makes the size of the force the enemy of the cost of the equipment the force needs – a capability-capacity crunch.  Indeed, the Dutch are now struggling to afford any military capabilities hence only 37 JSF which is not a viable force.  ‘Not a viable force’ is an accusation that can now be levelled against the entirety of the Dutch armed forces as The Hague drives them below an irreducible level.

With proliferation of strategic weapons across a world full of friction the Dutch Government seems all too happy for the American, British and French taxpayers to bear the true cost of defending the Netherlands and its interests.  This is a tragedy because having worked with the Royal Netherlands Armed Forces I have witnessed first-hand the outstanding quality of Dutch personnel.

Will the people of Riga sleep sound in their bed?  Yes for now but not for much longer if countries like the Netherlands think their defence is someone else’s problem. The Dutch are cutting NATO.

Julian Lindley-French, 23 September 2013

The Future of the Dutch Armed Forces (summary)

The paper entitled 'In the interest of the Netherlands' sets out important decisions concerning the future of the Netherlands armed forces. The Netherlands government has opted for an armed forces that is sustainable, both from an operational and a financial point of view. This will ensure that the armed forces are future-proof and financially solid.

Having a high-quality armed forces is in the interests of the Netherlands and its allies. The threats and risks we face, both now and in the future, are diffuse. Having the ability to exercise escalation dominance is important—on land, at sea and in the air. In the future, the Netherlands armed forces will still be able to conduct all types of operations, both at home and abroad. Our participation in missions will, however, sometimes have to be limited to shorter periods of time than was previously possible.

Within the available budget, there will also be a strong focus on innovation and new investments. Examples are the replacement of the F-16 with the F-35 and the accelerated formation of the Cyber Command. We also put priority on intensifying our cooperation with international partners and national, non-military authorities. This will enhance the armed forces’ ability to take action.

In order to ensure that our finances are kept in order, the paper incorporates various reorganisations as well as a number of government-wide cutbacks. Given the importance we attach to innovation and high-tech materiel, the Ministry of Defence will continue to work towards bringing its annual investment percentage back up to 20 percent.  The combination of our current basic and niche capabilities forms a solid basis on which to build. Maintaining military niche capabilities is of great importance to the Netherlands, as there are shortfalls in certain niche capabilities within the EU and NATO. The niche capabilities to be maintained include the Patriot units, the Submarine Service and the German-Netherlands Corps Headquarters.

The paper also emphasises the role of the Ministry of Defence in the area of national security. One-third of our total military capacity is deployed on a daily basis for ensuring security in the Netherlands. This includes coastguard tasks, explosive ordnance disposal and specialist assistance to judicial authorities in tracking down and rounding up criminal networks.

There are three criteria to take into account when making choices between capabilities: usability, adaptability and durability. First: the armed forces must be able to achieve the required results in diverse circumstances and in various types of missions. This requires a sound balance between combat units and support units. In addition, the capabilities must be adaptable to rapidly changing (operational) circumstances. The greater the adaptability, the more extensive are our deployment options. Third: capabilities must continue to be deployable in the future under different circumstances.

The direction in which the Royal Netherlands Navy has been developing and its close cooperation with the Belgian navy will remain unchanged. The same applies to our surface fleet. The Air Defence and Command (ADC) frigates are among the most modern in the world. Due to their specific characteristics, the Walrus-class submarines will continue to be a relevant niche capability for NATO and the EU. The two Landing Platform Docks with embarked marines will form the core of our sea-based maritime combat power. However, the Joint Support Ship, which is currently under construction, will not be commissioned. Instead, the Ministry of Defence will procure a more basic and less expensive supply ship.
32 Marine Company in Aruba is to be disbanded. In future, the tasks in Aruba will be carried out by rotating units of the Royal Netherlands Navy and the Royal Netherlands Army, as is already the case in Curaçao.

The Royal Netherlands Army will continue to develop into a versatile, modular organisation. In future, the army will have mechanised, motorised and airmobile battalions at its disposal. A mechanised battalion is built around the modern CV90 tracked vehicle, while a motorised battalion is built around the Bushmaster wheeled vehicle and the open-top Mercedes Benz 280CDI. 45 Mechanised Infantry Battalion is to be disbanded, leaving a total of eight infantry battalions, six of which are part of the Royal Netherlands Army. The airmobile brigade will continue to be an important initial-entry capability for the army, also when operating in combination with the Special Forces Regiment. Our cooperation with the German army will be further enhanced by integrating the Airmobile Brigade with the Division Schnelle Kräfte. The three brigade headquarters in Havelte, Oirschot and Schaarsbergen will continue to enable the army to integrate individual modules into a national battalion task force (such as Task Force Uruzgan), as well as in an international context (such as a NATO Response Force or an EU Battle Group).

The German-Netherlands Corps Headquarters in Munster will develop further into a rapidly deployable joint headquarters, capable of directing combined land-based and air-based operations. A large part of the army consists of scarce ‘enablers’— such as combat support units and combat service support units—which work for all the operational commands.

In the past few years, the Royal Netherlands Air Force has proven once again to be an indispensable element of the armed forces. With the F-35, the Ministry of Defence has made a well-considered choice for a high-tech, future-oriented air force. From a military operational perspective, it offers the greatest number of options. It has been decided that the replacement of the F-16 will be carried out entirely within the previously reserved investment budget and the current operating budget. This will prevent budget displacement effects, which would sooner or later come at the cost of other capabilities. The deployability of our helicopters will be improved in the coming years by increasing the number of flying hours. Extra funds will be made available for that purpose. With regard to transport aircraft, the Ministry of Defence’s long-term aim is for full international integration of its air transport capability in order to create the economies of scale necessary in the long term for effective operations.

Finally, the tasks of the Royal Netherlands Marechaussee will remain unchanged but will be carried out differently. The territorial division of capabilities will no longer be a dominant factor. Instead, a mobile and flexible approach will be adopted, based on information-driven operations. Due to the measures being taken by the operational commands and a further reduction of the number of locations, there will be fewer military police tasks.

This set of measures will allow the Netherlands armed forces to fulfil our national and international responsibilities, both now and in the future.

(Ministry of Defence, 17 September 2013)

[Note: in the original version of this policy paper summary, the order is: Air Force - Navy - Army. This has been changed into the more traditional order, i.e. according to the century and year in which these components were established, HdV]

Germany, Netherlands to enhance military cooperation

Declaration of Intent between the Federal Minister of Defence of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Minister of Defence of the Kingdom of the Netherlands on the further Enhancement of Bilateral Relations in the Field of Defence

The Federal Minister of Defence of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Minister of Defence of the Kingdom of the Netherlands hereinafter referred to as the “sides”, resolved to promote international stability and to secure peace in the spirit of the Charter of the United Nations and the North Atlantic Treaty and the Treaty on the European Union having regard to:

· the Declaration of Intent between the Federal Minister of Defence of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Minister of Defence of the Kingdom of the Netherlands on a New Approach towards Bilateral Defence Cooperation, June 19th 2002;

· the German-Netherlands Common Army Vision on Future Cooperation, April 6th 2005;

· the Memorandum of Understanding between the Federal Ministry of Defence of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Minister of Defence of the Kingdom of the Netherlands concerning defence materiel cooperation, August 29th 2006;

· the Agreement between the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands on bilateral defence cooperation, November 8th 2006;

· the Memorandum of Understanding between the Minister of Defence of the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the Federal Ministry of Defence of the Federal Republic of Germany concerning the Cooperation of the Armed Forces in the Field of Training, October 2nd 2008;

· the Letter of Intent between the Commander of the German Army and the Commander of the Royal Netherlands Army on Intensified Army Cooperation, July 12th 2012; welcome the very positive development in recent years of the traditionally excellent and friendly relations between Germany and the Netherlands. Both sides share the understanding that this Declaration of Intent will highlight and confirm their existing excellent relations and provide a sound basis for the even further enhancement of the German-Netherlands cooperation in the future.

The enhancement of German-Netherlands cooperation will comprise security, defence and armaments policy aspects, in order to represent common interests in an international environment in a coordinated, efficient and effective manner, including practical military cooperation between the Services. Furthermore, cooperation will be broadened in the areas of capabilities as well as operations, joint exercises and training. Bearing in mind that today’s security challenges can be tackled more effectively when working together, both sides explicitly welcome cooperation with additional partners.

Security, Defence and Armaments Policy
Both sides share common interests and values. These will remain the firm basis of their bilateral relations and be at the core of their enhanced cooperation in the future. Both sides intend to further strengthen the ability of NATO and the European Union to take action in matters of security, defence and armaments policy.

A vital condition for successful, viable and results-oriented German-Netherlands cooperation is a mutual understanding between partners and a shared view of the strategic challenges. Only on this foundation, will both sides succeed in defining common objectives, developing joint courses of action and identifying the required assets and capabilities.

Both sides will identify, discuss and strive for a common understanding of defence-related strategic and policy issues of common interest. They therefore intend to maintain close relations at defence ministers’ level and to continue their semi-annual bilateral security policy talks at Policy Directors’ level (High Level Steering Group).

Cooperation on Capabilities 
Multinational approaches as well as Pooling & Sharing are key instruments in closing capability gaps and in ensuring the provision of adequate military capabilities. Both sides strongly support the EU and NATO initiatives currently being pursued. The two sides underline that closer cooperation will improve efficiency in the area of capability development, thus creating a long-term advantage for both countries. All possibilities for bilateral cooperation will be exploited, within all areas of concept & capability development, command and control, combat as well as combat support and combat service support. Further progress must be made towards harmonizing the common analysis of future national capability needs. Both sides will additionally strive for an optimum resource allocation and cost-efficiency in all defence-related areas. Both sides will meet frequently at ministerial level to coordinate plans and to investigate new initiatives for cooperation on capabilities.

An enhanced cooperation and capability development is to be supported by military research and technology, defence procurement and the logistic support for all systems of interest. To strengthen cooperation on capability development, the National Capability Directors will meet when required. To strengthen armaments cooperation, the National Armaments Directors will meet every six months, moreover, a steering committee will be established for current activities.

Operations, Joint Exercises and Training
Past combined efforts of the German and Netherlands armed forces include operations in Kosovo (KFOR), in Afghanistan (ISAF including two rotations of the 1 (German/Netherlands) Corps as ISAF HQ, PRT and the Police Training Mission in Kunduz), off the Horn of Africa (EUNAVFOR ATALANTA) and in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (EUFOR). Of recent date is the cooperation in the PATRIOT deployment to Turkey (ACTIVE FENCE/ANATOLIAN PROTECTOR). In view of their many commonalities in their strategic and operational approach to multinational operations, both sides declare their willingness to intensify all possibilities for cooperation, particularly in future operations.

Combined joint training and exercises as well as the mutual exchange of innovative plans and products, knowledge and lessons learned will substantially improve mutual understanding between the Armies, Navies and Air Forces, as well as the Medical Services, contribute towards enhanced interoperability during joint UN, NATO or EU-led operations and ultimately increase the effectiveness of both sides’ armed forces. In this context, particular attention will be paid to common planning, preparations and pre-deployment training and exercises in case their forces are engaged in operations where multinational interaction and cooperation at operational and tactical level is required. Both nations intend to enhance the use of 1 (German/Netherlands) Corps as platform for combined training as well as the leading command and control element for multinational operations. Furthermore, the integration of 11 (Netherlands) Airmobile Brigade (11(NLD) LMB) into the German Division Schnelle Kräfte (DEU DSK) by January 2014 will enhance interoperability and common planning, preparations and pre-deployment training. The permanent posting of exchange officers at MoD level and at headquarters as well as the exchange of personnel in their national units and of instructors and students/cadets at military educational institutions are well-established procedures and extremely valuable in underlining the willingness to integrate. Both sides are prepared to examine further possibilities to exchange personnel.

Both sides express their desire to continue the established cooperation in operations, joint exercises and training. In order to coordinate, facilitate and further develop this cooperation, both sides agree that their Armies, Navies and Air Forces as well as Medical Services will continue to conduct their staff talks and explore opportunities for establishing more permanent forms of cooperation and deeper integration. These efforts should take into account the potential of integrated command and control structures on a permanent basis to ensure unity of command in operations and exercises. At Service level, units could be placed under common operational command and be deeply integrated on a permanent basis while remaining stationed at their peace-time locations.

Conclusion
Being firmly convinced that the further enhancement of their cooperation will contribute to improving their joint response to future challenges and threats and have a positive impact on European Security and Defence, the two sides declare their intent to:

· continue the mutually beneficial, professional and friendly partnership in the interest of both countries and,

· further enhance cooperation at ministerial level as well as between the armed forces regarding Security, Defence and Armaments Policy, Cooperation on Capabilities and Cooperation on Operations, Joint Exercises and Training, based on a reciprocal examination of opportunities and areas that are of mutual interest.

Roadmap
Following this firm commitment to further expand and deepen their cooperation in the defence field both sides agree on a roadmap of energetic steps to achieve tangible results. This roadmap, attached as an annex to this declaration, will be regarded as a living, non-limitative document, serving to evaluate the status and progress of the German-Netherlands cooperation in the field of defence at ministerial level.

Signed in duplicate
Dr. Thomas de Maizière                       Jeanine Hennis-Plasschaert
Federal Minister of Defence                 Minister of Defence
of the Federal Republic of Germany     of the Kingdom of the Netherlands

++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++

Annex: Roadmap for the Further Enhancement of the Bilateral Relations in the Field of Defence

Goals:

A. Intensify the German-Netherlands defence cooperation, considering the necessity to identify new options by frequent consultations in flexible, effective and efficient formats, enhance coordination and monitoring of the various cooperation projects and include aspects of operations as well as planning and concept development;

B. Develop a shared view on the strategic challenges in order to define our ambitions in the
field of Security, Defence and Armaments Policy;

C. Strive for harmonization of defence planning processes in general.

In addition to the enhancement of cooperation activities at ministerial level, as described in the declaration and the goals above, the following non-exhaustive overview identifies further areas of intensified cooperation – in particular at Service level:

Cooperation on Capabilities Projects:
All of the following topics are already integrated in Army, Navy or Air Force cooperation, but the involvement of MoD Plans and Policy Directorates as well as defence materiel organisations is needed to support decision-making. This paragraph also mentions fields of cooperation that cannot be attributed to one single inter-Service cooperation, as a result of the diverging task assignment within the DEU and NLD Armed Forces.

· Maintenance of ground-based systems. DEU and NLD use similar ground-based systems, such as the Boxer, Fennek and PzH 2000. It is worthwhile investigating possibilities for cooperation in the fields of maintenance and logistics for these systems. As for procurement, maintenance and phase-out of Army equipment, common interests and approaches should be investigated in an early stage of the process;

· DEU and NLD are both partners in the NH-90 programme and already work together within the established agencies. Possibilities of strengthening cooperation in the field of maintenance, education and training should be developed. If DEU decides to procure the NFH version of the NH-90, a trilateral cooperation with Belgium, for instance on common spare part pooling and management might be beneficial;

· DEU and NLD are both in the preparation phase for procurement of a MALE UAV. If both countries decide to acquire the same UAV system, this will create several opportunities for materiel cooperation, which can be exploited. In addition, other forms of cooperation in the field of UAVs, such as education, training and operational use, will be possible;

· DEU and NLD both have expertise in designing and building submarines. Shared knowledge and expertise can be used for the design and development of a new class of submarines for both countries;

· Replacement of Mine Countermeasures capability. Together with Belgium, knowledge acquisition and sharing, in the field of mine countermeasures in order to investigate common replacement of MCM capabilities;

· Development of a (sea-based) Missile Defence Capability on the basis of the SMART-L
Radar;

· Combined procurement and stockpiling of supporting equipment and clothing.

Army cooperation:

· Development of 1 (German-Netherlands) Corps in Münster into a Joint Task Force Headquarters Land (JTF HQ L)/Joint Command and Control Capability (JC2C). Furthermore, both nations should evaluate the possibility of providing 1 (German/Netherlands) Corps as a JTF HQ (L)/JC2C to NATO’s Long-Term Rotation Plan (LTRP) in the future.

· The DEU-NLD Common Army Vision on Future Cooperation of April 6th 2005 is the basis for cooperation between the two Armies. DEU-NLD Army staff talks take place as Army Steering Group (ASG) meetings at least twice a year. The ASG identifies new opportunities for cooperation and coordinates and monitors the execution of cooperation initiatives. The recent new initiatives and studies (Project Griffin) to intensify the DEUNLD Army cooperation will be the main priority of the DEU-NLD ASG for the upcoming years. Promising supervised initiatives are investigated with highest priority. Currently existing fields of cooperation - mainly training and exercises - will be deepened where possible.

· Prioritized initiatives are:
Development of a bi-national DEU-NLD Fire Support unit (FOC within 3-5 years);
Common Joint Fire Support training;
Integration of 11(NLD) LMB (ground component) into DEU DSK (January 2014);
Training of NLD units with DEU tank units;
Intensification of DEU-NLD Training & Exercise including UN Training and Para Training & Exercises.

· The intent of the ASG is to bring forward implementation proposals to the Chiefs of Staff of the Armies no later than June 2013. Agreed proposals for short-term implementation (2013-2014) will be forwarded to the High-Level Steering Group for approval at ministerial level.

· Fields for medium and long-term (Army) feasibility studies are: common logistic support, logistic role specialization, CIS interoperability, officer and NCO training, common Army vision on land warfare, common doctrine on land warfare, NLD participation in DEU division staffs, attachment of units to 1 (German/Netherlands) Corps, development of common organizational structures (support), cooperation in Electronic Warfare, engineering and C-IED.

Air Force cooperation:

· Further integration within the EATC.
· Continue the intensification of bilateral cooperation on Ground Based Air and Missile Defence (GBA&MD) between DEU Air Force and NLD Army, as defined in the Terms of Reference of the bi-national project group.
· Intensify the existing GBA&MD cooperation by
Strengthening the cooperation in the areas of operations, logistics and training;
Embedding individual NLD GBA&MD experts into DEU GBA&MD Wing 1 “Schleswig-Holstein” in 2014;
Common further development of GBA&MD tactical firing exercises;
Aiming at developing a common mission-oriented (not standing) binational GBA&MD unit.
· Cooperation on helicopter capabilities (cross-Service DEU and NLD Armies and Air Forces):
DEU Participation in the NLD Helicopter Weapons Instructor Course (HWIC);
Cooperation in the field of Helicopter Underslung Loads Equipment (HUSLE) and Underslung Load Clearance (ULC);
Contribution to the integration of 11(NLD) LMB (ground component) into DEU DSK (January 2014);
Mutual participation in certification exercises, when both countries contribute to the same operational readiness unit (IRF/NRF or EUBG).
· Cooperation in the field of Space Situational Awareness;
· Development of combined Survive, Evade, Resist & Extract (SERE) training and education, together with Belgium.

Navy cooperation:
Widening and intensifying the existing cooperation between the DEU and NLD Navies on a
broad basis, such as:
· Education & Training: PWO Course, Air Defence Course, Very Shallow Water Operations (via CoE CSW at Kiel and MBS Eguermin at Oostende);
· Shipbuilding & Design: sharing of knowledge and expertise with regard to feasibility, operational concepts, design and procurement studies on new weapon systems;
· Exchange of personnel on board operational units;
· Sharing of Lessons Identified/Learned from operations.

In order to expand and deepen the cooperation between both navies, bilateral working groups will be established concerning:
· Sharing of knowledge and capabilities in replenishment, seabasing and amphibious operations;
· Establishment of a multinational Submarine Command during Operations, Training, Education and Logistics;
· Sharing of training facilities and capabilities (i.e. Helicopter Controller Training, Submarine Training Centre);
· Co-ordination of annual Operational Programming of assets;
· Shared development of naval doctrine;
· Exchange of information and mutual support regarding the development of a maritime Ballistic Missile Defence capability;
· Exchange of knowledge and experience on the use of UAVs on board naval units;
· Medical Service: cooperation of Medical Teams during operations (i.e. ATALANTA).
Cooperation between Medical Services:
· Development of a modular Role 2/3 facility, based on the Smart Defence project 1.15 and further development of a Trauma Registry System from point of wounding until final treatment, based on the NATO Trauma Registry software, available since November 2012.
· Continuation of the training of bi-national medevac crews in the EATC cooperation;
· Pre-deployment training for bi-national medical teams or units to be deployed;
· NLD contribution to further development of DEU education and training approach (including observer/trainer system);
· Explore opportunities for the mutual use of training facilities;
· Exchange of information: continue exchange of information and experience in the field of Mil Mental Healthcare, Rehabilitation, quality control systems and MEDINT;
· Investigate sustainable provision of primary healthcare for military personnel of 1 (German/Netherlands) Corps in Münster;

Cooperation DEU Streitkräftebasis and NLD Command Service Centre:

· Intensification of cooperation between NLD Defence Academy (NLDA) and Führungsakademie der Bundeswehr (FüAkBw) as well as exchange of lecturers at the DEU and NLD General Staff Courses.
· Reciprocal examination of opportunities in the fields of ISTAR, CBRN and C-RAM is of mutual interest for both armed forces.
· Intensification of cooperation with regard to training in CBRN Defence. Investigation of options for mutual CBRN Defence capability development and CBRN Defence units.
· Further exploration of options to enhance the NATO CIMIC capability development through close cooperation of the CCOE framework nations DEU and NLD. Investigation of the possibility for setting up DEU-NLD CIMIC formations at tactical level and to conduct common training.

(ministerie van Defensie, 28 mei 2013)