Remarks by the President in Address to European Youth
Palais des Beaux Arts
Brussels, Belgium
(...)
So I come here today to insist that we must never take for granted the progress that has been won here in Europe and advanced around the world, because the contest of ideas continues for your generation. And that’s what’s at stake in Ukraine today. Russia’s leadership is challenging truths that only a few weeks ago seemed self-evident -- that in the 21st century, the borders of Europe cannot be redrawn with force, that international law matters, that people and nations can make their own decisions about their future.
To be honest, if we defined our interests narrowly, if we applied a cold-hearted calculus, we might decide to look the other way. Our economy is not deeply integrated with Ukraine’s. Our people and our homeland face no direct threat from the invasion of Crimea. Our own borders are not threatened by Russia’s annexation. But that kind of casual indifference would ignore the lessons that are written in the cemeteries of this continent. It would allow the old way of doing things to regain a foothold in this young century. And that message would be heard not just in Europe, but in Asia and the Americas, in Africa and the Middle East.
And the consequences that would arise from complacency are not abstractions. The impact that they have on the lives of real people -- men and women just like us -- have to enter into our imaginations. Just look at the young people of Ukraine who were determined to take back their future from a government rotted by corruption -- the portraits of the fallen shot by snipers, the visitors who pay their respects at the Maidan. There was the university student, wrapped in the Ukrainian flag, expressing her hope that “every country should live by the law.” A postgraduate student, speaking of her fellow protesters, saying, “I want these people who are here to have dignity.” Imagine that you are the young woman who said, “there are some things that fear, police sticks and tear gas cannot destroy.”
We've never met these people, but we know them. Their voices echo calls for human dignity that rang out in European streets and squares for generations. Their voices echo those around the world who at this very moment fight for their dignity. These Ukrainians rejected a government that was stealing from the people instead of serving them, and are reaching for the same ideals that allow us to be here today.
None of us can know for certain what the coming days will bring in Ukraine, but I am confident that eventually those voices -- those voices for human dignity and opportunity and individual rights and rule of law -- those voices ultimately will triumph. I believe that over the long haul, as nations that are free, as free people, the future is ours. I believe this not because I’m naive, and I believe this not because of the strength of our arms or the size of our economies, I believe this because these ideals that we affirm are true; these ideals are universal.
Yes, we believe in democracy -- with elections that are free and fair; and independent judiciaries and opposition parties; civil society and uncensored information so that individuals can make their own choices. Yes, we believe in open economies based on free markets and innovation, and individual initiative and entrepreneurship, and trade and investment that creates a broader prosperity. And, yes, we believe in human dignity -- that every person is created equal, no matter who you are, or what you look like, or who you love, or where you come from. That is what we believe. That’s what makes us strong.
And our enduring strength is also reflected in our respect for an international system that protects the rights of both nations and people -- a United Nations and a Universal Declaration of Human Rights; international law and the means to enforce those laws. But we also know that those rules are not self-executing; they depend on people and nations of goodwill continually affirming them. And that’s why Russia’s violation of international law -- its assault on Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity -- must be met with condemnation. Not because we’re trying to keep Russia down, but because the principles that have meant so much to Europe and the world must be lifted up.
Over the last several days, the United States, Europe, and our partners around the world have been united in defense of these ideals, and united in support of the Ukrainian people. Together, we've condemned Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and rejected the legitimacy of the Crimean referendum. Together, we have isolated Russia politically, suspending it from the G8 nations and downgrading our bilateral ties. Together, we are imposing costs through sanctions that have left a mark on Russia and those accountable for its actions. And if the Russian leadership stays on its current course, together we will ensure that this isolation deepens. Sanctions will expand. And the toll on Russia’s economy, as well as its standing in the world, will only increase.
And meanwhile, the United States and our allies will continue to support the government of Ukraine as they chart a democratic course. Together, we are going to provide a significant package of assistance that can help stabilize the Ukrainian economy, and meet the basic needs of the people. Make no mistake: Neither the United States, nor Europe has any interest in controlling Ukraine. We have sent no troops there. What we want is for the Ukrainian people to make their own decisions, just like other free people around the world.
Understand, as well, this is not another Cold War that we’re entering into. After all, unlike the Soviet Union, Russia leads no bloc of nations, no global ideology. The United States and NATO do not seek any conflict with Russia. In fact, for more than 60 years, we have come together in NATO -- not to claim other lands, but to keep nations free. What we will do -- always -- is uphold our solemn obligation, our Article 5 duty to defend the sovereignty and territorial integrity of our allies. And in that promise we will never waver; NATO nations never stand alone.
Today, NATO planes patrol the skies over the Baltics, and we've reinforced our presence in Poland. And we’re prepared to do more. Going forward, every NATO member state must step up and carry its share of the burden by showing the political will to invest in our collective defense, and by developing the capabilities to serve as a source of international peace and security.
Of course, Ukraine is not a member of NATO -- in part because of its close and complex history with Russia. Nor will Russia be dislodged from Crimea or deterred from further escalation by military force. But with time, so long as we remain united, the Russian people will recognize that they cannot achieve security, prosperity and the status that they seek through brute force. And that’s why, throughout this crisis, we will combine our substantial pressure on Russia with an open door for diplomacy. I believe that for both Ukraine and Russia, a stable peace will come through de-escalation -- direct dialogue between Russia and the government of Ukraine and the international community; monitors who can ensure that the rights of all Ukrainians are protected; a process of constitutional reform within Ukraine; and free and fair elections this spring.
So far, Russia has resisted diplomatic overtures, annexing Crimea and massing large forces along Ukraine’s border. Russia has justified these actions as an effort to prevent problems on its own borders and to protect ethnic Russians inside Ukraine. Of course, there is no evidence, and never has been, of systemic violence against ethnic Russians inside of Ukraine. Moreover, many countries around the world face similar questions about their borders and ethnic minorities abroad, about sovereignty and self-determination. These are tensions that have led in other places to debate and democratic referendums, conflicts and uneasy co-existence. These are difficult issues, and it is precisely because these questions are hard that they must be addressed through constitutional means and international laws so that majorities cannot simply suppress minorities, and big countries cannot simply bully the small.
In defending its actions, Russian leaders have further claimed Kosovo as a precedent -- an example they say of the West interfering in the affairs of a smaller country, just as they’re doing now. But NATO only intervened after the people of Kosovo were systematically brutalized and killed for years. And Kosovo only left Serbia after a referendum was organized not outside the boundaries of international law, but in careful cooperation with the United Nations and with Kosovo’s neighbors. None of that even came close to happening in Crimea.
Moreover, Russia has pointed to America’s decision to go into Iraq as an example of Western hypocrisy. Now, it is true that the Iraq War was a subject of vigorous debate not just around the world, but in the United States as well. I participated in that debate and I opposed our military intervention there. But even in Iraq, America sought to work within the international system. We did not claim or annex Iraq’s territory. We did not grab its resources for our own gain. Instead, we ended our war and left Iraq to its people and a fully sovereign Iraqi state that could make decisions about its own future.
Of course, neither the United States nor Europe are perfect in adherence to our ideals, nor do we claim to be the sole arbiter of what is right or wrong in the world. We are human, after all, and we face difficult choices about how to exercise our power. But part of what makes us different is that we welcome criticism, just as we welcome the responsibilities that come with global leadership.
We look to the East and the South and see nations poised to play a growing role on the world stage, and we consider that a good thing. It reflects the same diversity that makes us stronger as a nation and the forces of integration and cooperation that Europe has advanced for decades. And in a world of challenges that are increasingly global, all of us have an interest in nations stepping forward to play their part -- to bear their share of the burden and to uphold international norms.
So our approach stands in stark contrast to the arguments coming out of Russia these days. It is absurd to suggest -- as a steady drumbeat of Russian voices do -- that America is somehow conspiring with fascists inside of Ukraine or failing to respect the Russian people. My grandfather served in Patton’s Army, just as many of your fathers and grandfathers fought against fascism. We Americans remember well the unimaginable sacrifices made by the Russian people in World War II, and we have honored those sacrifices.
Since the end of the Cold War, we have worked with Russia under successive administrations to build ties of culture and commerce and international community not as a favor to Russia, but because it was in our national interests. And together, we've secured nuclear materials from terrorists. We welcomed Russia into the G8 and the World Trade Organization. From the reduction of nuclear arms to the elimination of Syria’s chemical weapons, we believe the world has benefited when Russia chooses to cooperate on the basis of mutual interests and mutual respect.
So America, and the world and Europe, has an interest in a strong and responsible Russia, not a weak one. We want the Russian people to live in security, prosperity and dignity like everyone else -- proud of their own history. But that does not mean that Russia can run roughshod over its neighbors. Just because Russia has a deep history with Ukraine does not mean it should be able to dictate Ukraine’s future. No amount of propaganda can make right something that the world knows is wrong.
In the end, every society must chart its own course. America’s path or Europe’s path is not the only ways to reach freedom and justice. But on the fundamental principle that is at stake here -- the ability of nations and peoples to make their own choices -- there can be no going back. It’s not America that filled the Maidan with protesters -- it was Ukrainians. No foreign forces compelled the citizens of Tunis and Tripoli to rise up -- they did so on their own. From the Burmese parliamentarian pursuing reform to the young leaders fighting corruption and intolerance in Africa, we see something irreducible that all of us share as human beings -- a truth that will persevere in the face of violence and repression and will ultimately overcome.
(...)
(Full text: White House, 26 March 2014)
Posts tonen met het label United States. Alle posts tonen
Posts tonen met het label United States. Alle posts tonen
donderdag 27 maart 2014
maandag 15 april 2013
Beyond the Post-Cold War World
Stratfor
By George Friedman
Founder and Chairman
An era ended when the Soviet Union collapsed on Dec. 31, 1991. The confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union defined the Cold War period. The collapse of Europe framed that confrontation. After World War II, the Soviet and American armies occupied Europe. Both towered over the remnants of Europe's forces. The collapse of the European imperial system, the emergence of new states and a struggle between the Soviets and Americans for domination and influence also defined the confrontation. There were, of course, many other aspects and phases of the confrontation, but in the end, the Cold War was a struggle built on Europe's decline.
Many shifts in the international system accompanied the end of the Cold War. In fact, 1991 was an extraordinary and defining year. The Japanese economic miracle ended. China after Tiananmen Square inherited Japan's place as a rapidly growing, export-based economy, one defined by the continued pre-eminence of the Chinese Communist Party. The Maastricht Treaty was formulated, creating the structure of the subsequent European Union. A vast coalition dominated by the United States reversed the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.
Three things defined the post-Cold War world. The first was U.S. power. The second was the rise of China as the center of global industrial growth based on low wages. The third was the re-emergence of Europe as a massive, integrated economic power. Meanwhile, Russia, the main remnant of the Soviet Union, reeled while Japan shifted to a dramatically different economic mode.
The post-Cold War world had two phases. The first lasted from Dec. 31, 1991, until Sept. 11, 2001. The second lasted from 9/11 until now.
The initial phase of the post-Cold War world was built on two assumptions. The first assumption was that the United States was the dominant political and military power but that such power was less significant than before, since economics was the new focus. The second phase still revolved around the three Great Powers -- the United States, China and Europe -- but involved a major shift in the worldview of the United States, which then assumed that pre-eminence included the power to reshape the Islamic world through military action while China and Europe single-mindedly focused on economic matters.
The Three Pillars of the International System
In this new era, Europe is reeling economically and is divided politically. The idea of Europe codified in Maastricht no longer defines Europe. Like the Japanese economic miracle before it, the Chinese economic miracle is drawing to a close and Beijing is beginning to examine its military options. The United States is withdrawing from Afghanistan and reconsidering the relationship between global pre-eminence and global omnipotence. Nothing is as it was in 1991.
Europe primarily defined itself as an economic power, with sovereignty largely retained by its members but shaped by the rule of the European Union. Europe tried to have it all: economic integration and individual states. But now this untenable idea has reached its end and Europe is fragmenting. One region, including Germany, Austria, the Netherlands and Luxembourg, has low unemployment. The other region on the periphery has high or extraordinarily high unemployment.
Germany wants to retain the European Union to protect German trade interests and because Berlin properly fears the political consequences of a fragmented Europe. But as the creditor of last resort, Germany also wants to control the economic behavior of the EU nation-states. Berlin does not want to let off the European states by simply bailing them out. If it bails them out, it must control their budgets. But the member states do not want to cede sovereignty to a German-dominated EU apparatus in exchange for a bailout.
In the indebted peripheral region, Cyprus has been treated with particular economic savagery as part of the bailout process. Certainly, the Cypriots acted irresponsibly. But that label applies to all of the EU members, including Germany, who created an economic plant so vast that it could not begin to consume what it produces -- making the country utterly dependent on the willingness of others to buy German goods. There are thus many kinds of irresponsibility. How the European Union treats irresponsibility depends upon the power of the nation in question. Cyprus, small and marginal, has been crushed while larger nations receive more favorable treatment despite their own irresponsibility.
It has been said by many Europeans that Cyprus should never have been admitted to the European Union. That might be true, but it was admitted -- during the time of European hubris when it was felt that mere EU membership would redeem any nation. Now, Europe can no longer afford pride, and it is every nation for itself. Cyprus set the precedent that the weak will be crushed. It serves as a lesson to other weakening nations, a lesson that over time will transform the European idea of integration and sovereignty. The price of integration for the weak is high, and all of Europe is weak in some way.
In such an environment, sovereignty becomes sanctuary. It is interesting to watch Hungary ignore the European Union as Budapest reconstructs its political system to be more sovereign -- and more authoritarian -- in the wider storm raging around it. Authoritarian nationalism is an old European cure-all, one that is re-emerging, since no one wants to be the next Cyprus.
I have already said much about China, having argued for several years that China's economy couldn't possibly continue to expand at the same rate. Leaving aside all the specific arguments, extraordinarily rapid growth in an export-oriented economy requires economic health among its customers. It is nice to imagine expanded domestic demand, but in a country as impoverished as China, increasing demand requires revolutionizing life in the interior. China has tried this many times. It has never worked, and in any case China certainly couldn't make it work in the time needed. Instead, Beijing is maintaining growth by slashing profit margins on exports. What growth exists is neither what it used to be nor anywhere near as profitable. That sort of growth in Japan undermined financial viability as money was leant to companies to continue exporting and employing people -- money that would never be repaid.
It is interesting to recall the extravagant claims about the future of Japan in the 1980s. Awestruck by growth rates, Westerners did not see the hollowing out of the financial system as growth rates were sustained by cutting prices and profits. Japan's miracle seemed to be eternal. It wasn't, and neither is China's. And China has a problem that Japan didn't: a billion impoverished people. Japan exists, but behaves differently than it did before; the same is happening to China.
Both Europe and China thought about the world in the post-Cold War period similarly. Each believed that geopolitical questions and even questions of domestic politics could be suppressed and sometimes even ignored. They believed this because they both thought they had entered a period of permanent prosperity. 1991-2008 was in fact a period of extraordinary prosperity, one that both Europe and China simply assumed would never end and one whose prosperity would moot geopolitics and politics.
Periods of prosperity, of course, always alternate with periods of austerity, and now history has caught up with Europe and China. Europe, which had wanted union and sovereignty, is confronting the political realities of EU unwillingness to make the fundamental and difficult decisions on what union really meant. For its part, China wanted to have a free market and a communist regime in a region it would dominate economically. Its economic climax has left it with the question of whether the regime can survive in an uncontrolled economy, and what its regional power would look like if it weren't prosperous.
And the United States has emerged from the post-Cold War period with one towering lesson: However attractive military intervention is, it always looks easier at the beginning than at the end. The greatest military power in the world has the ability to defeat armies. But it is far more difficult to reshape societies in America's image. A Great Power manages the routine matters of the world not through military intervention, but through manipulating the balance of power. The issue is not that America is in decline. Rather, it is that even with the power the United States had in 2001, it could not impose its political will -- even though it had the power to disrupt and destroy regimes -- unless it was prepared to commit all of its power and treasure to transforming a country like Afghanistan. And that is a high price to pay for Afghan democracy.
The United States has emerged into the new period with what is still the largest economy in the world with the fewest economic problems of the three pillars of the post-Cold War world. It has also emerged with the greatest military power. But it has emerged far more mature and cautious than it entered the period. There are new phases in history, but not new world orders. Economies rise and fall, there are limits to the greatest military power and a Great Power needs prudence in both lending and invading.
A New Era Begins
Eras unfold in strange ways until you suddenly realize they are over. For example, the Cold War era meandered for decades, during which U.S.-Soviet detentes or the end of the Vietnam War could have seemed to signal the end of the era itself. Now, we are at a point where the post-Cold War model no longer explains the behavior of the world. We are thus entering a new era. I don't have a good buzzword for the phase we're entering, since most periods are given a label in hindsight. (The interwar period, for example, got a name only after there was another war to bracket it.) But already there are several defining characteristics to this era we can identify.
First, the United States remains the world's dominant power in all dimensions. It will act with caution, however, recognizing the crucial difference between pre-eminence and omnipotence.
Second, Europe is returning to its normal condition of multiple competing nation-states. While Germany will dream of a Europe in which it can write the budgets of lesser states, the EU nation-states will look at Cyprus and choose default before losing sovereignty.
Third, Russia is re-emerging. As the European Peninsula fragments, the Russians will do what they always do: fish in muddy waters. Russia is giving preferential terms for natural gas imports to some countries, buying metallurgical facilities in Hungary and Poland, and buying rail terminals in Slovakia. Russia has always been economically dysfunctional yet wielded outsized influence -- recall the Cold War. The deals they are making, of which this is a small sample, are not in their economic interests, but they increase Moscow's political influence substantially.
Fourth, China is becoming self-absorbed in trying to manage its new economic realities. Aligning the Communist Party with lower growth rates is not easy. The Party's reason for being is prosperity. Without prosperity, it has little to offer beyond a much more authoritarian state.
And fifth, a host of new countries will emerge to supplement China as the world's low-wage, high-growth epicenter. Latin America, Africa and less-developed parts of Southeast Asia are all emerging as contenders.
Relativity in the Balance of Power
There is a paradox in all of this. While the United States has committed many errors, the fragmentation of Europe and the weakening of China mean the United States emerges more powerful, since power is relative. It was said that the post-Cold War world was America's time of dominance. I would argue that it was the preface of U.S. dominance. Its two great counterbalances are losing their ability to counter U.S. power because they mistakenly believed that real power was economic power. The United States had combined power -- economic, political and military -- and that allowed it to maintain its overall power when economic power faltered.
A fragmented Europe has no chance at balancing the United States. And while China is reaching for military power, it will take many years to produce the kind of power that is global, and it can do so only if its economy allows it to. The United States defeated the Soviet Union in the Cold War because of its balanced power. Europe and China defeated themselves because they placed all their chips on economics. And now we enter the new era.
Beyond the Post-Cold War World is republished with permission of Stratfor.
(Stratfor, 2 April 2013)
By George Friedman
Founder and Chairman
An era ended when the Soviet Union collapsed on Dec. 31, 1991. The confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union defined the Cold War period. The collapse of Europe framed that confrontation. After World War II, the Soviet and American armies occupied Europe. Both towered over the remnants of Europe's forces. The collapse of the European imperial system, the emergence of new states and a struggle between the Soviets and Americans for domination and influence also defined the confrontation. There were, of course, many other aspects and phases of the confrontation, but in the end, the Cold War was a struggle built on Europe's decline.
Many shifts in the international system accompanied the end of the Cold War. In fact, 1991 was an extraordinary and defining year. The Japanese economic miracle ended. China after Tiananmen Square inherited Japan's place as a rapidly growing, export-based economy, one defined by the continued pre-eminence of the Chinese Communist Party. The Maastricht Treaty was formulated, creating the structure of the subsequent European Union. A vast coalition dominated by the United States reversed the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.
Three things defined the post-Cold War world. The first was U.S. power. The second was the rise of China as the center of global industrial growth based on low wages. The third was the re-emergence of Europe as a massive, integrated economic power. Meanwhile, Russia, the main remnant of the Soviet Union, reeled while Japan shifted to a dramatically different economic mode.
The post-Cold War world had two phases. The first lasted from Dec. 31, 1991, until Sept. 11, 2001. The second lasted from 9/11 until now.
The initial phase of the post-Cold War world was built on two assumptions. The first assumption was that the United States was the dominant political and military power but that such power was less significant than before, since economics was the new focus. The second phase still revolved around the three Great Powers -- the United States, China and Europe -- but involved a major shift in the worldview of the United States, which then assumed that pre-eminence included the power to reshape the Islamic world through military action while China and Europe single-mindedly focused on economic matters.
The Three Pillars of the International System
In this new era, Europe is reeling economically and is divided politically. The idea of Europe codified in Maastricht no longer defines Europe. Like the Japanese economic miracle before it, the Chinese economic miracle is drawing to a close and Beijing is beginning to examine its military options. The United States is withdrawing from Afghanistan and reconsidering the relationship between global pre-eminence and global omnipotence. Nothing is as it was in 1991.
Europe primarily defined itself as an economic power, with sovereignty largely retained by its members but shaped by the rule of the European Union. Europe tried to have it all: economic integration and individual states. But now this untenable idea has reached its end and Europe is fragmenting. One region, including Germany, Austria, the Netherlands and Luxembourg, has low unemployment. The other region on the periphery has high or extraordinarily high unemployment.
Germany wants to retain the European Union to protect German trade interests and because Berlin properly fears the political consequences of a fragmented Europe. But as the creditor of last resort, Germany also wants to control the economic behavior of the EU nation-states. Berlin does not want to let off the European states by simply bailing them out. If it bails them out, it must control their budgets. But the member states do not want to cede sovereignty to a German-dominated EU apparatus in exchange for a bailout.
In the indebted peripheral region, Cyprus has been treated with particular economic savagery as part of the bailout process. Certainly, the Cypriots acted irresponsibly. But that label applies to all of the EU members, including Germany, who created an economic plant so vast that it could not begin to consume what it produces -- making the country utterly dependent on the willingness of others to buy German goods. There are thus many kinds of irresponsibility. How the European Union treats irresponsibility depends upon the power of the nation in question. Cyprus, small and marginal, has been crushed while larger nations receive more favorable treatment despite their own irresponsibility.
It has been said by many Europeans that Cyprus should never have been admitted to the European Union. That might be true, but it was admitted -- during the time of European hubris when it was felt that mere EU membership would redeem any nation. Now, Europe can no longer afford pride, and it is every nation for itself. Cyprus set the precedent that the weak will be crushed. It serves as a lesson to other weakening nations, a lesson that over time will transform the European idea of integration and sovereignty. The price of integration for the weak is high, and all of Europe is weak in some way.
In such an environment, sovereignty becomes sanctuary. It is interesting to watch Hungary ignore the European Union as Budapest reconstructs its political system to be more sovereign -- and more authoritarian -- in the wider storm raging around it. Authoritarian nationalism is an old European cure-all, one that is re-emerging, since no one wants to be the next Cyprus.
I have already said much about China, having argued for several years that China's economy couldn't possibly continue to expand at the same rate. Leaving aside all the specific arguments, extraordinarily rapid growth in an export-oriented economy requires economic health among its customers. It is nice to imagine expanded domestic demand, but in a country as impoverished as China, increasing demand requires revolutionizing life in the interior. China has tried this many times. It has never worked, and in any case China certainly couldn't make it work in the time needed. Instead, Beijing is maintaining growth by slashing profit margins on exports. What growth exists is neither what it used to be nor anywhere near as profitable. That sort of growth in Japan undermined financial viability as money was leant to companies to continue exporting and employing people -- money that would never be repaid.
It is interesting to recall the extravagant claims about the future of Japan in the 1980s. Awestruck by growth rates, Westerners did not see the hollowing out of the financial system as growth rates were sustained by cutting prices and profits. Japan's miracle seemed to be eternal. It wasn't, and neither is China's. And China has a problem that Japan didn't: a billion impoverished people. Japan exists, but behaves differently than it did before; the same is happening to China.
Both Europe and China thought about the world in the post-Cold War period similarly. Each believed that geopolitical questions and even questions of domestic politics could be suppressed and sometimes even ignored. They believed this because they both thought they had entered a period of permanent prosperity. 1991-2008 was in fact a period of extraordinary prosperity, one that both Europe and China simply assumed would never end and one whose prosperity would moot geopolitics and politics.
Periods of prosperity, of course, always alternate with periods of austerity, and now history has caught up with Europe and China. Europe, which had wanted union and sovereignty, is confronting the political realities of EU unwillingness to make the fundamental and difficult decisions on what union really meant. For its part, China wanted to have a free market and a communist regime in a region it would dominate economically. Its economic climax has left it with the question of whether the regime can survive in an uncontrolled economy, and what its regional power would look like if it weren't prosperous.
And the United States has emerged from the post-Cold War period with one towering lesson: However attractive military intervention is, it always looks easier at the beginning than at the end. The greatest military power in the world has the ability to defeat armies. But it is far more difficult to reshape societies in America's image. A Great Power manages the routine matters of the world not through military intervention, but through manipulating the balance of power. The issue is not that America is in decline. Rather, it is that even with the power the United States had in 2001, it could not impose its political will -- even though it had the power to disrupt and destroy regimes -- unless it was prepared to commit all of its power and treasure to transforming a country like Afghanistan. And that is a high price to pay for Afghan democracy.
The United States has emerged into the new period with what is still the largest economy in the world with the fewest economic problems of the three pillars of the post-Cold War world. It has also emerged with the greatest military power. But it has emerged far more mature and cautious than it entered the period. There are new phases in history, but not new world orders. Economies rise and fall, there are limits to the greatest military power and a Great Power needs prudence in both lending and invading.
A New Era Begins
Eras unfold in strange ways until you suddenly realize they are over. For example, the Cold War era meandered for decades, during which U.S.-Soviet detentes or the end of the Vietnam War could have seemed to signal the end of the era itself. Now, we are at a point where the post-Cold War model no longer explains the behavior of the world. We are thus entering a new era. I don't have a good buzzword for the phase we're entering, since most periods are given a label in hindsight. (The interwar period, for example, got a name only after there was another war to bracket it.) But already there are several defining characteristics to this era we can identify.
First, the United States remains the world's dominant power in all dimensions. It will act with caution, however, recognizing the crucial difference between pre-eminence and omnipotence.
Second, Europe is returning to its normal condition of multiple competing nation-states. While Germany will dream of a Europe in which it can write the budgets of lesser states, the EU nation-states will look at Cyprus and choose default before losing sovereignty.
Third, Russia is re-emerging. As the European Peninsula fragments, the Russians will do what they always do: fish in muddy waters. Russia is giving preferential terms for natural gas imports to some countries, buying metallurgical facilities in Hungary and Poland, and buying rail terminals in Slovakia. Russia has always been economically dysfunctional yet wielded outsized influence -- recall the Cold War. The deals they are making, of which this is a small sample, are not in their economic interests, but they increase Moscow's political influence substantially.
Fourth, China is becoming self-absorbed in trying to manage its new economic realities. Aligning the Communist Party with lower growth rates is not easy. The Party's reason for being is prosperity. Without prosperity, it has little to offer beyond a much more authoritarian state.
And fifth, a host of new countries will emerge to supplement China as the world's low-wage, high-growth epicenter. Latin America, Africa and less-developed parts of Southeast Asia are all emerging as contenders.
Relativity in the Balance of Power
There is a paradox in all of this. While the United States has committed many errors, the fragmentation of Europe and the weakening of China mean the United States emerges more powerful, since power is relative. It was said that the post-Cold War world was America's time of dominance. I would argue that it was the preface of U.S. dominance. Its two great counterbalances are losing their ability to counter U.S. power because they mistakenly believed that real power was economic power. The United States had combined power -- economic, political and military -- and that allowed it to maintain its overall power when economic power faltered.
A fragmented Europe has no chance at balancing the United States. And while China is reaching for military power, it will take many years to produce the kind of power that is global, and it can do so only if its economy allows it to. The United States defeated the Soviet Union in the Cold War because of its balanced power. Europe and China defeated themselves because they placed all their chips on economics. And now we enter the new era.
Beyond the Post-Cold War World is republished with permission of Stratfor.
(Stratfor, 2 April 2013)
donderdag 24 januari 2013
NATO press briefing on the deployment of Patriot Missiles to Turkey
Press briefing on the deployment of Patriot Missiles to Turkey
by NATO Spokesperson Oana Lungescu and Brigadier General Gary Deakin, Director of SHAPE Strategic Operations Center
Good afternoon. Thank you very much for coming.
As you know, Patriot batteries from Germany, the Netherlands and the United States are now only days away from becoming operational in Turkey so we thought it would be timely to have a technical briefing today to explain the sequence of events that will eventually see NATO take control of these defensive batteries to help protect Turkey’s population and territory.
Let me just remind you briefly that in response to Turkey’s request, NATO Defence Ministers decided on the 4th of December last year to augment Turkey’s air defence capabilities in order to defend the population and territory of Turkey and to contribute to the de-escalation of the crisis along the Alliance’s border.
The deployment of the Patriots will be defensive only, but it sends a very strong signal of Allied solidarity.
I am very happy to introduce to you our briefer from SHAPE (Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe), Brigadier Gary Deakin, who is the Director of the Strategic Operations Centre at SHAPE who will take us through this NATO effort and will explain how the batteries will be brought under NATO Command and control in the coming weeks.
The Brigadier will speak on the record, and if you have any specific technical questions on the systems, the Brigadier will explain any arrangements we have. We have got some staff officers on hand who will be able to help with answers on background after this briefing is over.
Brigadier…
Brigadier General Gary Deakin (Director of SHAPE Strategic Operations Centre): Thank you very much, Oana. Good afternoon, everybody. If I can just begin with a little bit more detail on myself. I'm obviously a British Army officer and I'm employed down in Allied Command Operations, coordinating operations at the strategic level. So when the strategic direction came from the NAC to SACEUR to deploy assets to augment Turkey air defence then the task came to my organization to make the plan.
I've got a number of experts who are with me. There are three officers in the front row here who are absolute technical experts on the detail of the systems, and so afterwards there's an opportunity... where there's a really difficult question that I can't answer, then they're ready to help out.
And my aim will be to really tell you the story as we see it right now, where we've come from and where we are at the moment, and then where we see this augmentation of Turkey's air defence going to.
And currently, it's all going according to plan which is really excellent news from our perspective.
Firstly, some context. The deployment is part of a plan that we already have. We have a standing defence plan for the air policing of NATO. And so this is not anything spectacularly new for us. The augmentation of Turkey's already robust air defence was an extra. It was within a framework of business that we already do.
We've also done this before, and indeed, The deployed to support Turkey's air defence in 1991 and 2003. So it's not... it's not new and in that way we've been able to carry out this mission quickly to provide support to the Ally as requested.
Now, we've... when the strategic direction was given to us at the beginning of December, after the Foreign Ministers meeting, SACEUR immediately set about generating the forces required and we were very fortunate to have Germany, Netherlands and the U.S. offer Patriot batteries to deploy as soon as possible to Turkey to provide this extra support. And we also stood up the NATO communications agencies to provide the CIS, the Communications Information System support to the Patriots so they could plug into the NATO Command and Control network.
So the mobilization commenced almost as soon as we got the direction. And you will have observed that the U.S. were the first to deploy assets into theatre by air, into Incirlik, which we know is the air point of disembarkation. And their initial package arrived at the beginning of January.
And then The Netherlands and Germany sailed their assets from ports in Northern Europe some two weeks ago now and as you'll be probably tracking today, they've arrived now in Iskenderun in Turkey; are unloading and unloaded and are moving out to their positions.
We expect to have an initial operating capability this weekend. That's what we're aiming at. And so it'll be confirmed at the weekend, but we're aiming for initial operating capability this weekend.
What do I mean by initial operating capability? This is where we'll have the ability... NATO will have the ability to defend some aspects of the population of what we're going to actually cover in the big picture. The first units will arrive on station. They will plug into the NATO Command and Control network and they will be then ready to defend the population. So that's what we're calling initial operating capability.
The full capability we expect to deliver... we're aiming to deliver, at the end of the month. That's our aim and that's when we'll have all the patriots in and complete. All the sustainment mechanisms in and the whole organization plugged into the NATO CIS coordinated with Turkey's air defence to provide the support... the NATO support to Turkey as requested.
And currently all that is on track.
And so The Netherlands are going to deploy to Adana. The Germans are going to deploy to Kahramanmaras—apologies for the mispronunciation—and the U.S. are going to deploy to Gaziantep. And those locations were decided in close coordination with our Turkish Allies based on the size of the population, how we could get the equipment to get the best effect. A number of factors were considered to get the best deployment options with the resources available from the nations that made the offers in this case.
So it was a very detailed process in close collaboration with our Allies to get the right lay-down of the forces that are deploying.
We estimate that once it's in place at those locations that we will provide protection against missiles for up to 3.5 million people, is our current assessment. So 3.5 million Turkish people under the protection of this missile defence capability in support of Turkey's air defence.
And I'd also emphasize again, I mentioned a couple of minutes ago about the CIS aspects. Lots of nations involved in that. There'll be NATO detatchments each location, providing the communication support, so a lot of nations involved, not just those from the contributing nations, and they'll provide that support to enable the command and control of the Patriots.
So that's where we are right now. We're just heading towards our initial operating capability, aiming to have the whole thing set up by the end of the month.
Now let me just, briefly I think, explain the capabilities of the system so you can then come back with some questions.
So a Patriot battery has got four main elements. It's a multi-function radar, which performs search identification and tracks potential targets. It's an air engagement control station and this is the only manned piece of equipment in the battery. And its responsibility is to make sure all the other systems are working and that the identification and engagement of targets is correct and in line with the procedures.
And the Patriot operators sit in this station and they're able to terminate an engagement, and control the engagement as required.
The battery then has a number of launches and this can be between four and six, depending on the mission and depending on which nation has made the contribution.
And then each missile, each launcher has a number of missiles, and again, depending on the nation, but up to 16, with a variety of different types of missiles. In this case we'll focus on destroying targets which are missiles. That is the way that this has been put together in this mission's case.
So those batteries, two in each location, as I've just described, are all connected together, so all six are together, and they're then connected directly to Air Command Ramstein in Germany. That's the operational commander, General Breedlove. And they're plugged into a Command and Control Centre there. And that Command and Control Centre is also... has situational awareness of what is happening in the region in terms of missile firings or early warning. So we're able to identify when there's some sort of missile fired that alerts the Patriot batteries, and then they can then observe the arcs that they've got in their azimuth and react accordingly if a missile is a threat to the population in that particular area that they're deployed to.
I think another point I just wish to really stress, which is really important, is the Command and Control goes to Ramstein, but there's a piece of detailed coordination into what we call the Combined Air and Operations Centre, which is in Eskisehir in Turkey. And it's there at the coordination is carried out with all the air that's going on. So to make sure that there's no risk of any accident, so that it's all very carefully controlled and coordinated.
So the air space is managed correctly. And again, this is, as I said at the beginning, this is normal business for us. There's nothing new here. We're used to this and there are procedures that are in place and it'll be correctly controlled and coordinated to make sure that there is no risk of any sort of accident.
Okay, I think that sort of covers the key points in terms of the lay down. I think hopefully I've described the... when it comes to it that the whole thing is set up and ready and we'll be ready, working very, very closely to our Turkish Allies in terms of augmenting their air defence to provide that defence to 3.5 million people. And should there be an alert on the early warning system, that will go to the Patriots and the Patriots from the nations will be ready to intercept and defend as required. And we're expecting the initial capability this weekend, that's what we're aiming at, and then we're aiming for the full capability by the end of the month.
And our current plans, and from my perspective sitting in operations, Admiral Stavridis's Operation Centre down in SHAPE, we're sort of initially planning that this will probably last for a year at least, and that's our commitment. That's what nations have said that they're prepared to commit to. Of course, there'll be decisions that may reduce that or extend it, but from our planning perspective we're planning to sustain this mission as required to augment Turkey's air defence.
If I can just clarify one really important point and that is, we're very closely integrated with the Turkish Allies in terms of the chain of command at all levels. So we have a very close relationship through each level of command, from the battery... and what I mean by that, the Patriot battery is located in an area where the Turkish military commander is going to provide him with some local support, et cetera, all the way then through to the coordination centre in the CAOC and then there are Turkish liaison officers who have gone to Air Ramstein and Air Ramstein has put liaison officers into the Turkish chain of command.
And in my own organization down in Mons, I also have liaison officers who have come from the Turkish General Staff to make sure that we've absolutely got the integration correct through all the different levels.
I think I've hopefully said enough, painted a little bit of a picture of what it looks like, where we are, and where we're going. I now stand ready to answer any questions and as I said, I've got a team to help.
Oana Lungescu (NATO Spokesperson): And as usual, please don't forget to introduce yourselves and we'll start with German Television. Just wait for the microphone Kai.
Q: I just have the question whether the whole area is now covered by the Patriots? Are there enough Patriots to cover the long borderline between Syria and Turkey? And would there... would there be the possibility to impact a No-Fly Zone if wanted with the Patriots that are at this border at the moment?
Brigadier General Gary Deakin: Okay, well, firstly the whole... Turkey's border is 900 kilometres long, so the coverage is not... will not cover the border. We're aiming at what we can with the capabilities provided, so we've got as much coverage of the population with the capabilities that nations have offered, and our assessment is that 3.5 million people in the south-western corner, southern part of Turkey over those cities and those areas that I've explained.
We don't have the capabilities to provide it extensively in the area you just described.
The capability is not being deployed at all to have anything to do with a No-Fly Zone. It's completely defensive. And it couldn't be transitioned to do so at this time. The capability is not set for that. It's not designed. The orders are not in line with that and that's what we've set out to do. It's a purely defensive mission in order to deter and hopefully deescalate and provide protection to those 3.5 million people and support our NATO Ally.
Oana Lungescu: Dutch News Agency. Over there.
Q: Sorry, it wasn't me.
Q: Hi, Robert Blumen of the Dutch Press Agency. I've got a question about initial capacity. Will there be a difference between the Dutch, German and American Patriots so that the Dutch will start, or will it be in general the initial capacity on Saturday/Sunday? You get the question?
Brigadier General Gary Deakin: Yes, yes, I understand, yes. They're very similar in terms of capacity. So the initial capability is arriving, setting up, plugging into the system, having the CIS working, being part of the whole process. That is very similar to each of the nations.
There are minor differences in terms of capabilities and going through sort of start-up procedures. But that's very, very technical and perhaps you could... you know, if you want to come back off line with the experts to clarify. But broadly it's much the same.
Q: (Inaudible...).
Brigadier General Gary Deakin: Oh no, no, no. Sorry, just to be absolutely clear. No, we currently see... I think The Netherlands will be the first to provide initial operation capability this weekend. And this is all to do with plugging in the communications technology, the site preparation, getting the sites prepared and our Turkish Allies have done a fantastic job in preparing the ground. You can imagine, you need level ground, you need shelters, you need things to put things in, and it just so happens in The Netherlands case all those things are aligning quite well. In the others it's still a little way to go to get those things completed.
Oana Lungescu: Reuters.
Q: Yes, Brigadier could you just confirm what you mean by initial operating capability? That means that the Patriot batteries, some of them, would be in place and ready to fire if necessary by this weekend, is that correct?
Brigadier General Gary Deakin: Yes. Yes, that is our aim, to have initial capability, which means we can defend with that system in place and we're aiming for this weekend. /2
by NATO Spokesperson Oana Lungescu and Brigadier General Gary Deakin, Director of SHAPE Strategic Operations Center
Good afternoon. Thank you very much for coming.
As you know, Patriot batteries from Germany, the Netherlands and the United States are now only days away from becoming operational in Turkey so we thought it would be timely to have a technical briefing today to explain the sequence of events that will eventually see NATO take control of these defensive batteries to help protect Turkey’s population and territory.
Let me just remind you briefly that in response to Turkey’s request, NATO Defence Ministers decided on the 4th of December last year to augment Turkey’s air defence capabilities in order to defend the population and territory of Turkey and to contribute to the de-escalation of the crisis along the Alliance’s border.
The deployment of the Patriots will be defensive only, but it sends a very strong signal of Allied solidarity.
I am very happy to introduce to you our briefer from SHAPE (Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe), Brigadier Gary Deakin, who is the Director of the Strategic Operations Centre at SHAPE who will take us through this NATO effort and will explain how the batteries will be brought under NATO Command and control in the coming weeks.
The Brigadier will speak on the record, and if you have any specific technical questions on the systems, the Brigadier will explain any arrangements we have. We have got some staff officers on hand who will be able to help with answers on background after this briefing is over.
Brigadier…
Brigadier General Gary Deakin (Director of SHAPE Strategic Operations Centre): Thank you very much, Oana. Good afternoon, everybody. If I can just begin with a little bit more detail on myself. I'm obviously a British Army officer and I'm employed down in Allied Command Operations, coordinating operations at the strategic level. So when the strategic direction came from the NAC to SACEUR to deploy assets to augment Turkey air defence then the task came to my organization to make the plan.
I've got a number of experts who are with me. There are three officers in the front row here who are absolute technical experts on the detail of the systems, and so afterwards there's an opportunity... where there's a really difficult question that I can't answer, then they're ready to help out.
And my aim will be to really tell you the story as we see it right now, where we've come from and where we are at the moment, and then where we see this augmentation of Turkey's air defence going to.
And currently, it's all going according to plan which is really excellent news from our perspective.
Firstly, some context. The deployment is part of a plan that we already have. We have a standing defence plan for the air policing of NATO. And so this is not anything spectacularly new for us. The augmentation of Turkey's already robust air defence was an extra. It was within a framework of business that we already do.
We've also done this before, and indeed, The deployed to support Turkey's air defence in 1991 and 2003. So it's not... it's not new and in that way we've been able to carry out this mission quickly to provide support to the Ally as requested.
Now, we've... when the strategic direction was given to us at the beginning of December, after the Foreign Ministers meeting, SACEUR immediately set about generating the forces required and we were very fortunate to have Germany, Netherlands and the U.S. offer Patriot batteries to deploy as soon as possible to Turkey to provide this extra support. And we also stood up the NATO communications agencies to provide the CIS, the Communications Information System support to the Patriots so they could plug into the NATO Command and Control network.
So the mobilization commenced almost as soon as we got the direction. And you will have observed that the U.S. were the first to deploy assets into theatre by air, into Incirlik, which we know is the air point of disembarkation. And their initial package arrived at the beginning of January.
And then The Netherlands and Germany sailed their assets from ports in Northern Europe some two weeks ago now and as you'll be probably tracking today, they've arrived now in Iskenderun in Turkey; are unloading and unloaded and are moving out to their positions.
We expect to have an initial operating capability this weekend. That's what we're aiming at. And so it'll be confirmed at the weekend, but we're aiming for initial operating capability this weekend.
What do I mean by initial operating capability? This is where we'll have the ability... NATO will have the ability to defend some aspects of the population of what we're going to actually cover in the big picture. The first units will arrive on station. They will plug into the NATO Command and Control network and they will be then ready to defend the population. So that's what we're calling initial operating capability.
The full capability we expect to deliver... we're aiming to deliver, at the end of the month. That's our aim and that's when we'll have all the patriots in and complete. All the sustainment mechanisms in and the whole organization plugged into the NATO CIS coordinated with Turkey's air defence to provide the support... the NATO support to Turkey as requested.
And currently all that is on track.
And so The Netherlands are going to deploy to Adana. The Germans are going to deploy to Kahramanmaras—apologies for the mispronunciation—and the U.S. are going to deploy to Gaziantep. And those locations were decided in close coordination with our Turkish Allies based on the size of the population, how we could get the equipment to get the best effect. A number of factors were considered to get the best deployment options with the resources available from the nations that made the offers in this case.
So it was a very detailed process in close collaboration with our Allies to get the right lay-down of the forces that are deploying.
We estimate that once it's in place at those locations that we will provide protection against missiles for up to 3.5 million people, is our current assessment. So 3.5 million Turkish people under the protection of this missile defence capability in support of Turkey's air defence.
And I'd also emphasize again, I mentioned a couple of minutes ago about the CIS aspects. Lots of nations involved in that. There'll be NATO detatchments each location, providing the communication support, so a lot of nations involved, not just those from the contributing nations, and they'll provide that support to enable the command and control of the Patriots.
So that's where we are right now. We're just heading towards our initial operating capability, aiming to have the whole thing set up by the end of the month.
Now let me just, briefly I think, explain the capabilities of the system so you can then come back with some questions.
So a Patriot battery has got four main elements. It's a multi-function radar, which performs search identification and tracks potential targets. It's an air engagement control station and this is the only manned piece of equipment in the battery. And its responsibility is to make sure all the other systems are working and that the identification and engagement of targets is correct and in line with the procedures.
And the Patriot operators sit in this station and they're able to terminate an engagement, and control the engagement as required.
The battery then has a number of launches and this can be between four and six, depending on the mission and depending on which nation has made the contribution.
And then each missile, each launcher has a number of missiles, and again, depending on the nation, but up to 16, with a variety of different types of missiles. In this case we'll focus on destroying targets which are missiles. That is the way that this has been put together in this mission's case.
So those batteries, two in each location, as I've just described, are all connected together, so all six are together, and they're then connected directly to Air Command Ramstein in Germany. That's the operational commander, General Breedlove. And they're plugged into a Command and Control Centre there. And that Command and Control Centre is also... has situational awareness of what is happening in the region in terms of missile firings or early warning. So we're able to identify when there's some sort of missile fired that alerts the Patriot batteries, and then they can then observe the arcs that they've got in their azimuth and react accordingly if a missile is a threat to the population in that particular area that they're deployed to.
I think another point I just wish to really stress, which is really important, is the Command and Control goes to Ramstein, but there's a piece of detailed coordination into what we call the Combined Air and Operations Centre, which is in Eskisehir in Turkey. And it's there at the coordination is carried out with all the air that's going on. So to make sure that there's no risk of any accident, so that it's all very carefully controlled and coordinated.
So the air space is managed correctly. And again, this is, as I said at the beginning, this is normal business for us. There's nothing new here. We're used to this and there are procedures that are in place and it'll be correctly controlled and coordinated to make sure that there is no risk of any sort of accident.
Okay, I think that sort of covers the key points in terms of the lay down. I think hopefully I've described the... when it comes to it that the whole thing is set up and ready and we'll be ready, working very, very closely to our Turkish Allies in terms of augmenting their air defence to provide that defence to 3.5 million people. And should there be an alert on the early warning system, that will go to the Patriots and the Patriots from the nations will be ready to intercept and defend as required. And we're expecting the initial capability this weekend, that's what we're aiming at, and then we're aiming for the full capability by the end of the month.
And our current plans, and from my perspective sitting in operations, Admiral Stavridis's Operation Centre down in SHAPE, we're sort of initially planning that this will probably last for a year at least, and that's our commitment. That's what nations have said that they're prepared to commit to. Of course, there'll be decisions that may reduce that or extend it, but from our planning perspective we're planning to sustain this mission as required to augment Turkey's air defence.
If I can just clarify one really important point and that is, we're very closely integrated with the Turkish Allies in terms of the chain of command at all levels. So we have a very close relationship through each level of command, from the battery... and what I mean by that, the Patriot battery is located in an area where the Turkish military commander is going to provide him with some local support, et cetera, all the way then through to the coordination centre in the CAOC and then there are Turkish liaison officers who have gone to Air Ramstein and Air Ramstein has put liaison officers into the Turkish chain of command.
And in my own organization down in Mons, I also have liaison officers who have come from the Turkish General Staff to make sure that we've absolutely got the integration correct through all the different levels.
I think I've hopefully said enough, painted a little bit of a picture of what it looks like, where we are, and where we're going. I now stand ready to answer any questions and as I said, I've got a team to help.
Oana Lungescu (NATO Spokesperson): And as usual, please don't forget to introduce yourselves and we'll start with German Television. Just wait for the microphone Kai.
Q: I just have the question whether the whole area is now covered by the Patriots? Are there enough Patriots to cover the long borderline between Syria and Turkey? And would there... would there be the possibility to impact a No-Fly Zone if wanted with the Patriots that are at this border at the moment?
Brigadier General Gary Deakin: Okay, well, firstly the whole... Turkey's border is 900 kilometres long, so the coverage is not... will not cover the border. We're aiming at what we can with the capabilities provided, so we've got as much coverage of the population with the capabilities that nations have offered, and our assessment is that 3.5 million people in the south-western corner, southern part of Turkey over those cities and those areas that I've explained.
We don't have the capabilities to provide it extensively in the area you just described.
The capability is not being deployed at all to have anything to do with a No-Fly Zone. It's completely defensive. And it couldn't be transitioned to do so at this time. The capability is not set for that. It's not designed. The orders are not in line with that and that's what we've set out to do. It's a purely defensive mission in order to deter and hopefully deescalate and provide protection to those 3.5 million people and support our NATO Ally.
Oana Lungescu: Dutch News Agency. Over there.
Q: Sorry, it wasn't me.
Q: Hi, Robert Blumen of the Dutch Press Agency. I've got a question about initial capacity. Will there be a difference between the Dutch, German and American Patriots so that the Dutch will start, or will it be in general the initial capacity on Saturday/Sunday? You get the question?
Brigadier General Gary Deakin: Yes, yes, I understand, yes. They're very similar in terms of capacity. So the initial capability is arriving, setting up, plugging into the system, having the CIS working, being part of the whole process. That is very similar to each of the nations.
There are minor differences in terms of capabilities and going through sort of start-up procedures. But that's very, very technical and perhaps you could... you know, if you want to come back off line with the experts to clarify. But broadly it's much the same.
Q: (Inaudible...).
Brigadier General Gary Deakin: Oh no, no, no. Sorry, just to be absolutely clear. No, we currently see... I think The Netherlands will be the first to provide initial operation capability this weekend. And this is all to do with plugging in the communications technology, the site preparation, getting the sites prepared and our Turkish Allies have done a fantastic job in preparing the ground. You can imagine, you need level ground, you need shelters, you need things to put things in, and it just so happens in The Netherlands case all those things are aligning quite well. In the others it's still a little way to go to get those things completed.
Oana Lungescu: Reuters.
Q: Yes, Brigadier could you just confirm what you mean by initial operating capability? That means that the Patriot batteries, some of them, would be in place and ready to fire if necessary by this weekend, is that correct?
Brigadier General Gary Deakin: Yes. Yes, that is our aim, to have initial capability, which means we can defend with that system in place and we're aiming for this weekend. /2
zaterdag 22 december 2012
NATO Spokesperson’s statement on the deployment of Patriot missiles to Turkey
The three NATO Allies which have agreed to provide Patriot missiles to augment Turkey’s air defences – Germany, the Netherlands and the United States - have agreed on the locations where the batteries will be deployed.
This was decided jointly with Turkey as the host nation and in close coordination with the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, following a military assessment by the Allies involved and NATO’s Military Authorities. Germany, the Netherlands and the United States have offered to provide two Patriot batteries each. Germany will deploy its batteries to Kahramanmaras, the Netherlands will deploy its batteries to Adana, and the United States will deploy its batteries to Gaziantep.
The deployment, which will take place over the next few weeks, will be defensive only. It will not support a no-fly zone or any offensive operation. Its aim is to deter any threats to Turkey, to defend Turkey’s population and territory and to de-escalate the crisis on NATO’s south-eastern border.
(NATO, 22 December 2012)
This was decided jointly with Turkey as the host nation and in close coordination with the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, following a military assessment by the Allies involved and NATO’s Military Authorities. Germany, the Netherlands and the United States have offered to provide two Patriot batteries each. Germany will deploy its batteries to Kahramanmaras, the Netherlands will deploy its batteries to Adana, and the United States will deploy its batteries to Gaziantep.
The deployment, which will take place over the next few weeks, will be defensive only. It will not support a no-fly zone or any offensive operation. Its aim is to deter any threats to Turkey, to defend Turkey’s population and territory and to de-escalate the crisis on NATO’s south-eastern border.
(NATO, 22 December 2012)
dinsdag 27 november 2012
Dutch Chief of Defense Visits the United States
Chief of Defence General Tom Middendorp held an introductory visit with America’s highest serviceman, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Martin Dempsey and met with members of the Atlantic Council, in Washington DC.
In addition, he opened the “American Falcon” training exercise in Texas, a realistic air and army units exercise supported by American defense personnel stationed at Fort Hood in Texas.
Cooperation
The cooperation between the Netherlands and the United States was strongly emphasized during General Middendorp’s first meeting with General Dempsey. They discussed education and training issues in the United States, the current deployment of the armed forces and security field developments.
At a meeting at the Atlantic Council, General Middendorp spoke about the Dutch experiences and developments in the field of international and cited the extensive collaboration between the Netherlands, Belgium and Germany. The Atlantic Council Board praised the Netherlands for its pragmatic way of cooperation, aimed at making progress.
The Dutch-American cooperation is constantly evolving. About 150 members of 11 Airmobile Brigade and the Commando Corps participate with U.S. units participating in this American Falcon. This 5-week air assault exercise takes place 5 times a year at the army base in Fort Hood, Texas. General Middendorp spoke with U.S. Lieutenant General Donald Campbell (Commander III Corps) on the exercise and thanked him for the support.
Blind Trust
"In joint missions we need to be able to trust each other blindly,” explains Middendorp. Exercises like American Falcon play an important role in the readiness of the Dutch deployment. “This huge training area offers virtually unlimited training options compared with the Netherlands, with weather conditions we do not know. Here we can practice all day long all year round. It gives me the opportunity to prepare my people for deployment in Iraq and Afghanistan to the maximum extent.”
Permanently Stationed
Air assault is the most intensive and complex form of cooperation between ground and air units. This requires good coordination between ground and air units and regular training. That is why the Joint Netherlands Training Detachment (JNTD), consisting of 23 army and air force troops, is permanently stationed at Fort Hood since the beginning of this year. There are also eight Apache attack helicopters and more recently two new Chinook F-transport helicopters of the Royal Air Force, and a third is on the way.
(Netherlands Embassy, Washington, 27 November 2012)
In addition, he opened the “American Falcon” training exercise in Texas, a realistic air and army units exercise supported by American defense personnel stationed at Fort Hood in Texas.
 |
| Generals Dempsey and Middendorp |
Cooperation
The cooperation between the Netherlands and the United States was strongly emphasized during General Middendorp’s first meeting with General Dempsey. They discussed education and training issues in the United States, the current deployment of the armed forces and security field developments.
At a meeting at the Atlantic Council, General Middendorp spoke about the Dutch experiences and developments in the field of international and cited the extensive collaboration between the Netherlands, Belgium and Germany. The Atlantic Council Board praised the Netherlands for its pragmatic way of cooperation, aimed at making progress.
The Dutch-American cooperation is constantly evolving. About 150 members of 11 Airmobile Brigade and the Commando Corps participate with U.S. units participating in this American Falcon. This 5-week air assault exercise takes place 5 times a year at the army base in Fort Hood, Texas. General Middendorp spoke with U.S. Lieutenant General Donald Campbell (Commander III Corps) on the exercise and thanked him for the support.
Blind Trust
"In joint missions we need to be able to trust each other blindly,” explains Middendorp. Exercises like American Falcon play an important role in the readiness of the Dutch deployment. “This huge training area offers virtually unlimited training options compared with the Netherlands, with weather conditions we do not know. Here we can practice all day long all year round. It gives me the opportunity to prepare my people for deployment in Iraq and Afghanistan to the maximum extent.”
Permanently Stationed
Air assault is the most intensive and complex form of cooperation between ground and air units. This requires good coordination between ground and air units and regular training. That is why the Joint Netherlands Training Detachment (JNTD), consisting of 23 army and air force troops, is permanently stationed at Fort Hood since the beginning of this year. There are also eight Apache attack helicopters and more recently two new Chinook F-transport helicopters of the Royal Air Force, and a third is on the way.
(Netherlands Embassy, Washington, 27 November 2012)
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