Annex 4.4.: Movement of piracy proceeds offshore (STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL)*
Bovenstaande lege (want strikt vertrouwelijke) bijlage moet een van de meest interessante delen zijn van het nieuwste VN-rapport over Somalië. Het zal antwoord geven op de vraag: "waarheen (buiten Somalië zelf) gaat het losgeld dat voor gekaapte schepen en bemanningen is betaald?"
Dat de VN deze informatie onder de pet houdt is niet zo vreemd. Het gaat immers om lopend onderzoek, en het is niet zo slim om betrokken partijen publiekelijk inzicht te geven over de informatiepositie van de VN.
Nederland speelt bij dit onderzoek ook een rol. Het kabinet zegde begin dit jaar twee experts en 300.000 euro toe aan een op de Seychellen in te richten
Regional Anti-Piracy Prosecutions and Intelligence Coordination Centre (RAPPICC), zie
Kamerbrief . Met de bouw van een kantoor voor deze nieuwe instantie is eerder deze maand begonnen,
meldt het Britse ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken.
Piraterij is overigens maar één onderdeel van het nieuwste
Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea pursuant to Security Council resolution 2002 (2011). De
Monitoring Group doet er de volgende aanbevelingen aan de Veiligheidsraad in:
116. The Monitoring Group recommends that:
(a) The Committee should proceed without further delay to designate known pirates and their associates identified by the Monitoring Group or Member States for targeted measures;
(b) The Security Council should consider the possibility of establishing a specialized investigative group of experts with a mandate to collect information, gather evidence and record testimonies relating to acts of Somali piracy, including and especially the identification of pirate leaders, financiers, negotiators, facilitators, support networks and beneficiaries;
(c) The Security Council should consider making explicit reference, in its next resolutions on Somalia and piracy, to the Monitoring Group’s responsibility of investigating and identifying key individuals responsible for acts of piracy off the coast of Somalia, as well as the movement and investment of piracy proceeds, and call upon Governments, international organizations and national law enforcement agencies to exchange evidence and information with a view to the arrest and the prosecution of senior pirate leaders and their associates, or to their designation for targeted measures;
(d) The Security Council should consider options for the establishment of an international regulatory authority that regulates, monitors and inspects the activities of private maritime security companies operating floating armouries and providing armed protection to vessels in international waters.
Aanbeveling (d) is extra interessant voor Nederland, gelet op de levendige discussie tussen overheid en reders over de inzet van
particuliere gewapende beveiligers op schepen die de Nederlandse vlag voeren. Volgens de reders is dat schering en inslag, maar het is op basis van de Nederlandse wetgeving verboden. De VN Monitoring Group pleit voor een internationaal toezichtsorgaan dat de activiteiten van gewapende beveiligers moet gaan reguleren en controleren.
III. Violations of the general and complete arms embargo
(...)
C. Private maritime security companies/floating armouries
72. The unmonitored and largely unregulated activities of private maritime security companies off the coast of Somalia, offering armed protection to ships and crews traversing the high-risk area, may represent a potential new channel for the flow of arms and ammunition into Somalia and the region.
73. During the course of the mandate of the Monitoring Group, this highly profitable business has expanded beyond the provision of armed escorts to the leasing of arms, ammunition and security equipment, and the establishment of “floating armouries” that operate in international waters beyond the remit of any effective international regulatory authority. Private maritime security companies are currently holding approximately 7,000 weapons in circulation, which are either owned or leased.
74. The absence of control and inspection of armed activities inevitably creates opportunities for illegality and abuse, and increases the risk that the maritime security industry will be exploited by unscrupulous and criminal actors, eventually coming to represent a threat to regional peace and security, rather than part of the solution. A detailed analysis of private maritime security companies and floating armouries can be found in annex 5.4.
In bijlage 4 van het rapport noemt de VN-Monitoring Group de belangrijkste trends op het gebied van de piraterij (
voor de vele voetnoten en case studies, zie het originele rapport). Wat onder andere opvalt is de onverholen kritiek van de VN op de autoriteiten van het noord-oostelijke gebied Puntland (spreek uit: Boentland). De kleine jongens in de piraterij worden (met royale financiële ondersteuning van donorlanden) wel aangepakt en opgesloten. Tegelijkertijd opereren in Puntland de grote jongens van de piraterijbusiness ongestraft; kloppen de statistieken van de autoriteiten van geen kant, en weigert Puntland tot nu toe zelfs een onderzoek van de VN ter plaatse.
Volgens de Monitoring Group is Puntland sinds begin 2011 weer het belangrijkste centrum van de piraten geworden. Met name het (zee)gebied rond het oostelijk gelegen Garacad wordt wat dit betreft genoemd.
Kritiek is er ook op landen die weinig tot niets doen aan de vervolging van piraten. Het rapport noemt o.a. Griekenland en de Verenigde Arabische Emiraten.
Annex 4.1.: Piracy overview: trends, judicial challenges and impunity
Overview
1. The year 2011 witnessed some positive developments in the battle against Somali piracy. Pirate activity increased, but the proportion of successful attacks dropped dramatically. Early 2012, however, saw a steep decline of around 50 per cent in both attack rates (43 versus 97) and successful hijackings (9 versus 16).
2. Nevertheless, Somali piracy continues to represent a significant threat to international shipping. Somalia’s two main pirate groups, the Puntland Piracy Network (PPN) and the Hobyo-Harardheere Piracy Network (HHPN), both remain active, well-organized and continue to operate from their usual anchorages,3 chiefly Harardheere (HHPN), Garacad (PPN), and a pirate camp some 17 nautical miles north of Bandar Beyla (PPN). From these and other, smaller bases, the pirates range across an immense area comprising the southern Red Sea, Gulf of Aden, Indian Ocean (east and south of Somalia down to the north of Mozambique), Arabian Sea and Gulf of Oman. Decreased success rates have been matched by increasingly protracted ransom negotiations, longer periods of captivity for hijacked crews and escalating ransom payments.
3. On 23 March 2012 the Council of the European Union extended the area of operations of the EU Naval Force (EU NAVFOR) counter-piracy mission, Operation Atalanta, to include Somali coastal territory and internal waters, in order to attack pirate camps and logistical bases. A first attack with maritime aircraft and attack helicopters was reportedly carried out in the early hours of 15 May 2012 along Somalia’s coastline in the central region of Gaalmudug. The Monitoring Group believes that this new military strategy has the potential to degrade pirate finances and morale, but its success will depend heavily on the frequency and effectiveness of the attacks, and could be counterproductive if it entails significant civilian casualties. On the other hand, Somali pirates have proven extremely adaptive, and will almost certainly take steps to disperse weapons and equipment, and to rethink their own tactics. One option available to them may be heavier weaponry to defend themselves against future attacks, and in the belief that foreign governments are not prepared to accept casualties in the conduct of counter-piracy missions. Another risk is the possibility of closer cooperation between pirates and Al-Shabaab militias in areas such as Harardheere, where many fighters in both groups are drawn from the same clans. An escalation in violence might also impact upon pirate negotiating demands and the treatment of hostages: a day after the airborne attack on 15 May, for example, Harardheere pirates threatened to kill European hostages in the event of any future attack against them.
Tactics, Techniques, Weapons and Equipment
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